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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law - Freedom of the Press Not Affected by New York
City's Gross Receipts Tax.-The Comptroller of the City of New York determined that the petitioner was liable for payment of the New York City
General Business and Finance Tax ("gross receipts tax")' for the sale or
license of his literary works within New York City. The court unanimously
affirmed, holding that while the literary activities of an author2 fall under the
protection of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, a gross receipts tax on all trades, businesses, professions, and commercial activities does
not contravene constitutional guarantees when applied to the sale or license of
rights in literary works. Steinbeck v. Gerosa, 4 N.Y.2d 302, 151 N.E. 170, 175
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1958).
The first amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... "1
There is no similar express limitation on the power of the state governments in
the Federal Constitution, but freedom of the press is considered one of the
fundamental rights protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 4 which is binding tpon the states.5 Although the primary purpose of this
guarantee in the Constitution is to prevent prior restraints on publication, 6 the
framers of the Federal Constitution meant to prohibit any means by which the
government might prevent "such free and general discussion of public matters
as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise
of their rights as citizens." 7
In Grosjean v. American Press Co., s the Court dealt with a state tax on the
1. The court of appeals referred to the New York City General Business and Finance
Tax as the "gross receipts tax." It is imposed pursuant to § 24-a of the Gen. (ity Law
which authorizes New York City to impose "a tax upon persons carrying on or exercising
for gain or profit within such city, any trade, business, profession, vocation or commercial
activity ... or making sales within such city ......

2. Freedom of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals, but necessarily
embraces pamphlets, leaflets and every other sort of publication affording a vehicle of
information. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938).
3. U.S. Const. amend. I.
4. "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. .. ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

5. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925);
see 16 Boston L. Rev. 919 (1936).
6. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462
(1907) ; see 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed. 1927).
7. 2 Cooley, supra note 6, at 886.
8. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). The United States Supreme Court in deciding cases involving
religious freedom used some language which might tend to indicate that a tax may never
be imposed on the exercise of any constitutional privilege. "The exaction of a tax as a
condition to the exercise of the great liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment is . ..
obnoxious." Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944). "Freedom of
press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position." Murdock v.
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advertising of newspapers having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per
week. The tax was not measured by the amount of advertising, but by the
extent of circulation. 9 Since the biggest source of revenue for newspapers is
the income received from its advertising, a more proper tax would have been
one which was measured by the income from advertising or even the income
received from all sources. Each newspaper would then pay a tax directly proportionate to the amount of income received. 10 After reviewing the history
and surrounding circumstances of the tax, the Court found that its objective was
not revenue, but suppression of newspapers hostile to the incumbent administration of the state. The tax was, therefore, held unconstitutional as a violation
of the due process clause. The court deemed it unnecessary to consider
whether it was also a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
In the instant case, the court dealt with a general tax.' 2 The petitioner did
not contend that the amount of the tax was harsh or oppressive, or that the
tax served to curtail his freedom to write or disseminate his works. Thus, the
petitioner's position was reduced to the contention that literary works were
free from all burdens of taxation.' 3 Where commercial activities in general
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). This language when read out of context may give
superficial support to a contention that no tax may ever be imposed on constitutional
privileges, but it was uttered in regard to a license tax, laid for the privilege of distributing
religious literature, thereby imposing a prior restraint on the exercising of the privilege.
In the instant case the Court dealt with a tax which did not impose any prior restraints.
Anyone had the right to exercise the privilege of entering into the business of writing. A
tax was merely laid on the gross receipts derived from such enterprise. The tax is on a
commercial aspect unrelated to the constitutional privileges. Moreover, in the Murdock
case, "We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial
burdens of government ... it is one thing to impose a tax on the income ... of a preacher.
It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon."
319 U.S. at 112. These statements more accurately express the context into which the
previous statements were intended to be read.
9. There were thirteen newspapers in Louisiana which had a circulation of more than
20,000 copies per week, four other newspapers circulating slightly less; and 120 weekly
newspapers also in competition.
10. If a 2% tax were laid on the total income received by all newspapers, the tax would
be measured by the commercial aspects of the business. By measuring the tax only by
circulation, it is the vital press aspect of publishing that would be taxed.
11. 297 U.S. at 251.
12. See note 1 supra. The terms used in the statute were interpreted very broadly by
the court. The tax is so broad in its scope that it was deemed necessary to provide that
the phrase "'exercising any profession, vocation, trade, business or commercial activity'
does not include labor or services rendered by an individual for a wage or salary." New
York City Adm. Code, § B46-1.0, § 5.
13. This position has never been sustained. Taxes substantially similar to New
York's gross receipts tax, on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, have either
been denied certiorari or dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Giragi v.
Moore, 48 Ariz. 33, 58 P.2d 1249 (1936), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal
question, 301 U.S. 670 (1937); City of Corona v. Corona Daily Independent, 115 Cal. App.
2d 382, 252 P.2d 56, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 833 (1953); Tampa Times Co. v. City of Tampa,
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and literary activities incidentally are the subject of a general tax, it can not, as
a practical matter, be said that freedom of the press is being suppressed. 14 This
is because a tax on gross receipts is a source of revenue from the truly commercial aspect of the enterprise and not from the privilege of writing itself.
The press itself is not subject to control or regulation in any manner. Since
the press has business aspects, it should have no special immunity from laws
applicable to business in general. 15
With reference to the equal protection clause of the Constitution the press
stands in the same position as other persons or businesses.' 6 Thus, if an arbitrary
distinction were drawn so that the tax would apply only to certain authors or
newspapers, and the distinction had no reasonable basis, then even if the tax
applied to other persons or businesses as well, it would still deny equal protection of the laws.17 The courts have recognized the difficulty and danger in
8
attempts to define precisely the limitations of the equal protection clause.'
Absent the finding of an abridgement of freedom of the press, the tax in the
Grosjean case would seem to have denied the affected newspapers the equal
protection of the laws.' 9 Thus the tax would have been unconstitutional even
if the press were not involved. A tax, such as in Grosjean, applying to those
who do much business; while not applying to others engaging in the same enterprise, but doing less business, will deny the equal protection of the laws, when
no reasonable basis for the distinction exists.20 In the instant case the tax
158 Fla. 589, 29 So. 2d 368, appeal dismissed for want of substantial feder~l question,
332 U.S. 749 (1947); In re Jaeger, 29 S.C. 438, 7 S.E. 605 (1888); City of Norfolk
v. Norfolk Landmark Publishing Co., 95 Va. 564, 28 S.E. 959 (1898). A dismissal for
want of substantial federal question is a decision on the merits and has the force of precedent. It is distinguished from a denial of certiorari. Frankfurter and Hart, The Business of
the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 68, 77 (1935).
14. See A. S. Abell Co. v. City of Baltimore, 145 A.2d 111 (Md. Ct. App. 1958).
15. Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); see Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
16. If the press or persons employed by it were subjected to a special tax upon their
gross receipts only, not applicable to others that tax would be discriminatory. See A. S.
Abell Co. v. City of Baltimore, 145 A.2d 111 (Md. Ct. App. 1958).
17. See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman,
277 U.S. 32 (1928); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. King County, 264 U.S. 22 (1924);
Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544 (1923); Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
18. Various generalizations have been enunciated which serve as useful guideposts. No
person or groups shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or groups in like circumstances. A law must treat all alike with uniformity and
equality and without unreasonable distinctions. See cases cited in note 17 supra.
19. No reasonable basis existed for taxing only the newspapers with a large circulation.
This measure for taxing resulted in a discrimination against the thirteen largest, because
there were approximately 124 other newspapers in competition to a greater or lesser degree,
which were not subject to the tax at all. No material differences existed between the
newspapers circulating more than 20,000 copies weekly and other newspapers of the state.
20. A tax which derives more revenue from those doing much business than it does
from those doing less business, is not discriminatory. Businesses in some enterprises will be
taxed in varying amounts, but the inequality of the obligation has a reasonable distinction
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escaped the stricture of the equal protection clause since it did not single out
the press as a whole nor any of its members for a tax not applicable to other
members. The instant tax applied to the press and its members equally and
uniformly, affording to all the equal protection guaranteed in the fourteenth
amendment.
The concept of freedom of the press is not limited to preventing prior restraints but extends to any means by which the government might prevent "such
free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely" 2 ' necessary
to preserve the press as a vital source of public information. Any tax is a burden
to some extent, but that alone is insufficient to constitute an impairment of
freedom of the press. The courts must look to the circumstances surrounding
each case to determine whether the predominant purpose of the free press
guarantee22 is preserved. If a tax or law or any other governmental requirement does not serve to frustrate that end, then there is no impairment of the
23
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.

Issuance of Handbooks to Federal Jurors.-Part of an
interstate railroad track was dynamited during a labor dispute. Horton, Johnson and Million were indicted for the crime and a conspiracy to commit it.
Million pleaded guilty and became a witness for the United States. The jury
returned a verdict of guilty on both counts against appellant Horton and on
the conspiracy count against appellant Johnson. Subsequently, the appellants
discovered that the members of the jury panel had been given copies of the
"Handbook for Jurors Serving in the United States District Courts." Based on
this discovery appellants moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the
Criminal Law -

for its basis, i.e., the amount of the tax owed, is determined by the ability of the business
to pay. See Finley v. California, 222 U.S. 28 (1911); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899);
12 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law §§ 481, 485 (1938).
21. 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed. 1927).
22. For a good discussion see Donnelly, Government and Freedom of the Press, 45
111.
L. Rev. 31 (1950).
23. Another interesting aspect of the case was the petitioner's contention that even if
he is not exempt from the gross receipts tax, that part of his income which consists of
royalties paid to him by publishers, cannot be taxed because his writing and licensing for
publication either induced or commenced interstate commerce which is governed by the
commerce clause. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, Cl. 3. However, the instant court found
that Mr. Steinbeck was, in fact, not involved in interstate commerce himself, but
was merely a creditor of the publisher who was. Since the facts indicated no contractual arrangements which would constitute a joint venture, the parties had not joined
their interest and skills in such a way "that for the purpose of the particular adventure
their respective contributions have become as one. . . ." Hasday v. Barocas, 10 Misc. 2d
22, 28, 115 N.Y.S.2d 209, 215 (Sup. Ct. 1952). Nor were Mr. Steinbeck's activities so
closely related to interstate commerce as to constitute participation therein. Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). A local business or occupation may be
taxed even though it induces or commences interstate commerce, so long as it is separate
and distinct from the transportation and intercourse which is interstate commerce. Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, supra at 253.
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motion. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. The distribution of the handbook did not deny the appellants a fair
and impartial trial. Horton v. United States, 256 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1958).
The practice of issuing jury handbooks has been adopted in recent years 1
by a number of trial courts 2 as a means of instructing jurors in the machinery
of jury trial. The lack of such instruction is often assigned as one of the obstacles
to reliable jury verdicts.3 The handbook distributed to federal jurors has been
drafted by a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States4 and
is distributed only with the approval of the individual district judges. 5 It opens
with a note on the importance of jury duty in the administration of justice,
outlines the steps in the trial of a civil action, discusses the arguments of
counsel and the importance of the judge's charge. The manual then discusses
criminal cases, stating that they are somewhat like civil cases, and finally discusses indictments and sentencing.
In the United States v. Gordon,6 the first federal case to consider the practice, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a conviction by a
jury to whom the handbook had been issued. Such a policy of indoctrinating
jurors, the court felt, would require legislative authorization. The court also
pointed out that the manual inadequately distinguished between the shades of
proof required in civil and criminal actions and that the paragraph discussing
sentencing 7 was an invitation to the jury to return a verdict of guilty, leaving
1. A jury primer was used in the Second Judicial District of New York as early as 1925.
See Primary Lessons for Jurors, 11 A.B.A.J. 401 (1925).
2. See, e.g., Knight v. State, 50 Ariz. 108, 69 P.2d 569 (1937) ; People v. Lopez, 32 Cal.
2d 673, 197 P.2d 757 (1948); Ferrara v. State, 101 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1958); Richardson,
The jury, And Methods of Increasing Its Efficiency, 14 A.B.AJ. 410 (1928) (Kansas); Preliminary Instruction to jurors, 17 A.B-AJ. 282 (1931) (Wash.). A number of trial courts
have adopted the practice of having the judge merely give such instructions orally. See,
e.g., Dowd, General Instructions to the New Venire of Jurors, 9 Law Society journal of
Mass. 99 (1940); Lehigh, Statement to Petit jurors, 15 Ky. S.B.J. 106 (1951); Moore, Preliminary Remarks to jurors, 47 W. Va. L.Q. 323 (1941); Ulman, A judge Takes the Stand
23 (1930); 2d Rep. of the Conn. Judicial Council 12 (1930).
3. See Galston, Civil jury Trials and Tribulations, 29 A.B.A.J. 195 (1943); Richardson,
supra note 2, at 411. The judge-Jury Relationship in the State Courts, 23 Ore. L. Rev. 3
(1943); Report, Committee on Trial by jury Including Methods of Selecting jurors, 63
A.B.A. Rep. 559, 560 (1938).
4. For a history of the handbook see United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177, 186 (7th
Cir. 1958); Report to the judicial Conference of the Comm. on Selection of Jurors 10
(1942).
5. The handbook has not received the unanimous approval of the federal district
judges. See Knox, jury Selection, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 433, 443 (1947): "Some judges,
however, seem to believe that my Committee is another New Deal Bureaucracy, and is
attempting to tell them how to run their courts. Nothing, of course, could be farther from
the fact, and the handbook has been and will be distributed to such courts as wish to use it.
Such judges as think the manual is tomfoolery and a waste of public funds are not compelled to use it . ..."

6. 253 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1958).
7. The paragraph provides that: "'A verdict of guilty does not necessarily mean that
the defendant will receive a long sentence or that he will be required to serve any sentence
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the consequences to the court. An instruction in that language would have
constituted reversible error. The opinion was withdrawn and, on rehearing,
the majority held that the issue of the handbook had not been properly raised.
A concurring opinion held that the use of the handbook was valid and its contents were not prejudicial. Two dissenting opinions, however, maintained the
position of the original opinion. In the instant case, the first actually to hold
on the use of the handbook, the appeal was based on the grounds set forth in
the dissent of the Gordon case. The court did not discuss the legality of the
handbook but limited itself to a consideration of prejudice, holding that the
charge of the trial judge on the question of the burden of proof was more than
fair. The court refused to agree with the dissent in the Gordon case on the
paragraph discussing sentencing, asserting that it contained nothing which was
not an accurate statement of the powers of a sentencing judge. The court further pointed out that there was no showing that the jurors had in fact read
the pamphlet.
In United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp.,s decided within a month after
the instant case, an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upon the showing that one juror had read a pamphlet a distributed
on a prior occasion and had introduced its contents into the jury's deliberations
on recommending leniency. The court refused to find prejudice since the jury
subsequently asked for further instructions on this point. The court expressly
refused to find anything in the pamphlet which would prejudice the accuseds'
trial and concurred with the views of the concurring opinion in the Gordon
case on the constitutionality and legality of the handbook.
Patently the mere issuance of a handbook is not a violation of the seventh
amendment guaranteeing trial by jury as it existed at common law.' 0 Since the
accused's right to be present at all stages in the proceedings against him extends
only to the impaneling of the jury" it is not a technical violation of that right.
Nor would it be a real violation unless it is shown that its contents prejudiced
the jurors.
Whether its issuance is the prerogative of the Congress or the courts is not
without some dispute.' 2 However, most of the state appellate courts have conat all. The judge may impose such sentence as appears to him to be just within the limits
fixed by law or in a proper case he may suspend sentence and place the defendant on probation.'" 253 F.2d at 190.
8. 258 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 841 (1958).
9. That handbook, "A Handbook for Petit Jurors," was an earlier version of the one
distributed in the principal case.
10. Cf. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1942), rehearing denied, 320 U.S. 214
(1943).
11. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 provides: "The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at
every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict,
and at the imposition of sentence ... " See also Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
12. In addition to the dissent in the Gordon case, note 6 supra, see People v. Schoos,
399 IlM. 527, 78 N.E.2d 245 (1948), where it was held that a proposed quiz of the jury on
the contents of the handbook was in effect adding to the qualifications for jury and hence
in the domain of the legislature. But cf. People v. Izzo, 14 Ill. 2d 203, 151 N.E.2d 329
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ceded the power to be within the inherent powers of a court to control its own
proceedings. 13 This would appear to be the sounder view particularly in the
federal system as long as the handbook is not too extensive. Congress sets the
general qualifications of jurors1 4 but their actual selection is largely within the
discretionary power of the trial court. 15
The vital question in any consideration of the handbook must ultimately be
whether its contents prejudice the accused's right to a fair trial. Prejudicing
the minds of jurors because of statements which are irrelevant or inaccurate
when applied to a particular case is the danger necessarily inherent in issuing
general instructions. There is some conflict in the state courts over the approach which should be taken towards such statements. The early tendency
was to examine them as if they were specific instructions given by the judge
at the close of a trial1" but the prevailing view refuses to measure them against
(1958). The Schoos case is criticised in 62 Harv. L. Rev. 139 (1948) as failing to distinguish
between qualifications to select jurors and the subsequent qualification of those selected.
13. See, e.g., Knight v. State, 50 Ariz. 108, 69 P.2d 569 (1937); People v. Lopez, 32 Cal.
2d 673, 197 P.2d 757 (1948) ; Ferrara v. State, 101 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1958).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. V, 1958).
15. The list of names from which the panel is drawn is prepared by the Jury Commissioner who is appointed by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1864 (1952). Decisions on challenges to any of these jurors are made by the trial judge who also has the right to examine
the jurors. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a). In this respect the judge has a rather wide discretion
which is subject to reversal only if abused. Fredrick v. United States, 163 F.2d 536 (9th
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 775; Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1951).
The trial judge's discretion also extends to allowing the jury to take his written instructions
to the jury room if he has given written instructions. Copeland v. United States, 152 F.2d
769, cert. denied, 328 U.S. 841 (1945).
"In the national courts, however, the judge is more than an umpire. He may discuss,
explain, and analyze the testimony to the jury, and may express an opinion as to the guilt
or innocence of the accused . . . ."Ryan v. United States, 99 F.2d 864, 873 (8th Cir. 1938).

This wider discretion of federal trial judges is assigned as one of the reasons why the
federal jury trial has escaped much of the criticism that has been directed at trial by jury.
See Palmer, On Trial: The Jury Trial, 20 F.R.D. 65, 80 (1957); Report, Committee of the
Section of the Judicial Administration of the A.B-A., Instructions to Jurors, 10 F.R.D. 409,
413 (1951).
16. See, e.g., People v. Weatherford, 160 P.2d 210 (Cal. App.), aff'd, 27 Cal. 2d 401,
164 P.2d 753 (1945); People v. Schoos, 399 Ill. 527, 78 N.E.2d 245 (1948). In People v.
Weatherford, supra, the lower court sustained an objection to a jury manual "particularly in
view of the fact that the pamphlet contained certain statements entirely inapplicable to the

case on trial, such as the following: 'A verdict of guilty does not necessarily mean a term of
imprisonment in the state prison, but may, in some cases, result in a county jail sentence,
a fine, or proceedings under the provisions of the probation law." 160 P.2d at 216. This
case has been effectively overruled by People v. Lopez, 32 Cal. 2d 673, 197 P.2d 757 (1948).
The courts do not often assign reasons for treating the instructions as specific instructions. However, the dissenting opinion in People v. Lopez said: "Because these instructions
are placed in the possession of jurors so that they have access to them while they are not
actually performing jury duty, they have an opportunity to become more conversant with
them than with the specific instructions read by the court to the jury at the conclusion of
the trial. It may be assumed, therefore, that the instructions contained in the appendix of
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so exacting a standard. 11 In this difference of approach lies the explanation
for the conflict between the judges who dissented in the Gordon case and the
instant case. Approached as a charge given to the jury in the course of a trial,
the paragraph complained of, as inviting a verdict of guilty, might be held to
require a reversal,' 8 yet is an accurate statement of the power of a sentencing
judge.
The refusal of the federal courts to treat the handbook as an instruction
means that they will afford no presumption that the contents were read out
of context or that they were misapplied. Though not the safest approach, it
appears to be sound in respect to the federal handbook and, no doubt, was
dictated to an extent by the practical necessity of not opening the federal
courts to appeals from the innumerable convictions which have been gained
from "instructed" juries.
This, however, is not an argument for the continued contribution of the handbook in its present form. The failure to properly emphasize the difference in
civil and criminal actions should be corrected. There is also a need for greater
care in the wording of the manual. Perhaps a greater accuracy would be
achieved by allowing the bar as well as the bench to participate in the drafting
of the handbook. The final safeguard would be to submit copies of the handbook to counsel prior to the trial so that they could object to anything which
might prejudice jurors.
Damages - Recovery for Mental Anguish in Malpractice Suit.-Defendant
doctors negligently administered X-ray treatments to plaintiff's shoulder. Subsequently, serious burns, diagnosed as chronic radiodermatitis caused by the
X-ray therapy, appeared in the treated area. Approximately two years thereafter and before the burns had fully healed, plaintiff consulted a dermatologist
who, according to plaintiff's testimony at the trial, advised her to have the
shoulder periodically checked because the inflamed area might become cancerous. The plaintiff thereafter developed cancerophobia, a severe phobic apprehension that the injured area would become cancerous. In a malpractice suit,'
the jury awarded plaintiff $25,000, of which $15,000 was compensation for the
mental anguish resulting from the cancerophobia. This verdict was affirmed
unanimously, without opinion, by the appellate division. 2 By a 4-3 majority,
the court of appeals affirmed. An award of compensatory damages may include
the majority opinion will have greater influence upon the average juror than any other
instructions read by the court to the jury during the trial." 197 P.2d at 768.
17. See note 13 supra.
18. Ordinarily the sentence to be imposed on the accused is no concern of the jury
and if the trial judge mentions to the jury that the full penalty might not be given or that
the accused will be eligible for parole the conviction will be reversed on the grounds that
the way was open for a compromise verdict, Lovely v. United States, 169 F.2d 386 (4th
Cir., 1948), unless called forth by the remarks of counsel, Ryan v. United States, 99 F.2d
864 (8th Cir. 1938).
1. No opinion was rendered by the supreme court at trial term.
2. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 3 App. Div. 2d 829, 161 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1st Dep't 1957).
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a recovery for mental anguish endured in contemplation of a possible future
illness developing from a negligently inflicted physical injury, provided there
is adequate proof of the mental anguish and a reasonable basis for its existence.
Ferrarav. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
New York has long recognized that mental suffering may form an element
of damages where the victim has sustained an immediate personal injury or
some physical impact as the result of the negligent act of another.3 Where
the subsequent intervening negligence of a physician aggravates the original
injury, a recovery against the original wrongdoer may include damages for
the added physical and mental suffering endured. 4 In the absence of physical
impact, however, no recovery for mental suffering based on negligence has been6
allowed 5 even where the injured party subsequently suffered bodily harm.
The present case is unique in two respects: first, the act of the intervening
physician who advised periodic examinations for cancer apparently was not
negligent under the circumstances; secondly, the additional harm to the plaintiff was entirely mental in nature. The decision to allow recovery against the
negligent defendants for the added mental injury undoubtedly has widened
the scope of liability. It must be noted, however, that the holding of the instant
case has not swept away the prerequisite of physical impact or immediate personal injury.
Chief Judge Conway, writing for the majority, reasoned that the plaintiff's
conduct after she sustained the physical injury was reasonable; the advice she
received from the dermatologist and its effect upon her mind were causally
connected with the negligent act of the defendant 7 and were not so tenuous or
remote as to free the defendants from liability. Under the circumstances the
majority found a reasonable basis for plaintiff's mental suffering, and was
satisfied with the genuineness of the mental anguish claim.8 In cases where
3. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931); Ransom v. New York & E.
R.R., 15 N.Y. 415 (1857); Berg v. New York Soc'y for Relief of the Ruptured &
Crippled, 136 N.Y.S.2d 528, 531 (Sup. Ct.-1954), rev'd on other grounds, 286 App. biv.
783, 146 N.Y.S.2d 548 (lst Dep't 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 1 N.Y.2d 499, 136 N.E.2d
523, 154 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1956).
4. Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 270, 190 N.E. 487, 488 (1934).
5. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.,
151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) ; Stahl v. Necker, Inc., 184 App. Div. 85, 171 N.Y. Supp.
728 (1st Dep't 1918).
6. Comstock v. Wilson, supra note 5; Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra note 5.
7. As authority for its position, the court cited Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 270, 190
N.E. 487, 488 (1934), stating that the "rule is now well established that a wrongdoer is
liable for the ultimate result, though the mistake or even negligence of the physician who
treated the injury may have increased the damage which would otherwise have followed
from the original wrong." However, the principal case has extended this rule to allow
recovery against the wrongdoer for the ultimate result when the act of the intervening
physician is not negligent and the added injury is purely mental.
8. The court took judicial notice of the fact that "it is common knowledge among
laymen and even more widely among laywomen that wounds which do not heal over long
periods of time frequently become cancerous." 5 N.Y.2d at 22, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176
N.Y.S.2d at 1000. Additionally, it was observed that plaintiff was told by a doctor specializing in dermatology that the radiation burns possibly would become cancerous. Thus,
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there is no reasonable basis for mental anguish, the courts will decline to trace
its cause to the negligent act. The majority, however, expressly declined to
lay down a principle concerning a wrongdoer's liability for mental anguish
caused his victim as a result of information received from a doctor during the
treatment of a physical injury.
The dissent objected to the recovery for mental anguish on the ground that
it flowed from a statement attributed to the dermatologist (that cancer may
develop) which was established solely on the strength of hearsay testimony
of the plaintiff. 9 Even if the evidentiary objection was invalid, the dissent
would hald that damages for mental anguish should not have been imposed
because it was based on the speculative opinion of a medical expert as to the
mere possibility of cancer. Furthermore, it was argued that recovery was made
dependent upon the subjective state of mind of the litigating plaintiff without
even the safeguard of an expert opinion.
The reasoning of the dissent sidesteps the true issue. The plaintiff sought
to prove with reasonable certainty that she suffered from cancerophobia (not
cancer), and that this was a reasonable and actual fear of a future illness
proximately caused by the negligent act of the defendants. Whether the dermatologist's opinion was sound or speculative was not a crucial point, nor was
its truth or falsity relevant. In this case it made no difference whether the
development of cancer was a reasonable certainty or a possibility. The significance of the opinion of the dermatologist was the mere fact that it was
made and that it was one of the events naturally flowing from the defendant's
negligent act. It laid a reasonable basis for the actual mental anxiety which
the plaintiff thereafter endured. It is true, as maintained by the dissent, that
the cancerophobia was subjective in that its extent and duration was necessarily
dependent upon the make-up of plaintiff's personality. An objective determination of the reality of the anguish and its reasonableness, however, could be
and was made. Mental anguish should form an element of damages when it is
a reasonable and natural consequence of the negligent act. 10 In other words,
the court found a reasonable basis for the plaintiff's cancerophobia. Moreover, at the trial
a neuropsychiatrist testified that she was suffering from severe cancerophobia. The jury
observed the plaintiff's demeanor on the stand and accepted her testimony as true. In all
of this the court of appeals found a "guarantee of genuineness" of the cancerophobia.
9. The majority contended that plaintiff's testimony as to the statement made by the
dermatologist was introduced not for the purpose of proving that cancer would develop
but merely for the purpose of establishing that there was a reasonable basis for her mental
anxiety. The court reasoned that the truth of the statement was not in issue and, therefore, the testimony was not regarded as objectionable hearsay. It is interesting to note
that at the trial, the plaintiff was not permitted to testify as to the dermatologist's statement that cancer might develop until after her doctors testified. The court did not allow
the dermatologist to express an opinion as to the development of cancer unless he could
say he was reasonably certain of this result. Although the dermatologist testified that he
advised plaintiff to have her shoulder examined periodically, it appears that he understood
he was not to testify as to his reason for this advice, i.e., the possibility of cancer. Subsequently, the plaintiff was recalled to the stand and testified as to the reason the dermatologist gave her for this advice.
10. A factual situation which seems to represent an instance where recovery for mental
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there must be a reasonable basis for the actual mental anguish to be redressed. 1i
Perhaps the most important difference in the divergent opinions of the court
does not pertain directly to the ratio decidendi of the case. It is whether
damages for a purely mental injury ought to be awarded. Both opinions recognize the danger of fraud and the difficulties of proof that arise if an award of
compensatory damages is allowed in such actions. Each side appeals to
public policy and common sense to support its position; however, this sort of
argument does not solve the problem. No doubt all the justices would agree
that a remedy for a substantial wrong ought to be sanctioned when all the
elements of the cause of action are established with proper proof. The difficulty is whether a purely mental injury can be proven with reasonable certainty
as to justify the courts in distinguishing the spurious claim from the genuine.
The majority declared that, "freedom from mental disturbance is now a protected interest in this State.' 2 This statement is dictum but it may be a signpost pointing the way to a new road of tort liability in New York. In support
of this dictum the majority added:
[T]he only valid objection against recovery for mental injury is the danger of
vexatious suits and fictitious claims, which has loomed very large in the opinions
as an obstacle. The danger is a real one, and must be met. Mental disturbance is
easily imulated, and courts which are plagued with fraudulent personal injury claims
may well- be unwilling to open the door to an even more dubious field. But the
difficulty is not insuperable. Not only fright and shock, but other kinds of mental
injury are marked by definite physical symptoms, which are capable of clear medical
proof. It is entirely possible to allow recovery only upon satisfactory evidence and
deny it when there is nothing to corroborate the claim, or to look for some guarantee
of genuineness in the circumstances of the case. The problem is one of adequate
proof, and it is not necessary to deny a remedy in all cases because some claims
may be false. The very clear tendency of the recent cases is to refuse to admit
incompetence13 to deal with such a problem, and to find some basis for redress in a
proper case.
anguish should be denied is St. Louis, IM. & So. Ry. v. Buckner, 89 Ark. 58, 115 S.W.
923 (1909) cited in the dissenting opinion. Plaintiff was a passenger on defendant's railroad. On arriving at the station, she went into the waiting room. It was a cold, rainy
day and there was no heat in the. room. Plaintiff alleged she got a chill and that body
aches subsequently developed, followed by a cold, fever and stomach trouble which lasted
several months. Thereafter, plaintiff claimed she went to a sanitarium with a fear of
dying of consumption (her sister died of consumption and she thought she had all the
symptoms). In ordering a new trial, the court said: "Now mental anguish of the character
shown by this evidence is, at most, but a remote consequence of the physical injury which
appellant is alleged to have caused. The jury in such cases should be allowed to consider
only that mental anguish which accompanies the injury itself, which is fairly and reasonably the natural consequence that flows from it." 89 Ark. at 60, 115 S.W. at 924.
11. Mafiy other jurisdictions have handed down decisions which are in accord with
the instant case. Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 499, 111 Pac. 534 (1910);
Figlar v. Gordon, 133 Conn. 577, 53 A.2d 645 (1947); Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co.,
124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152 (1905); Buck v. Brady, 110 Md. 568, 73 Ati. 277 (1909).
12. 5 N.Y.2d at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 5 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
13. 5 N.Y.2d at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 5 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000. The majority was here
quoting from Prosser, Torts § 34, at 212-13 (1941).
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Survival of Alimony Rights After a Valid Ex Parte

Divorce.-Plaintiff, then a New York domiciliary, and defendant husband, a
Vermont domiciliary, were married in Connecticut in 1942. In 1944 they
established a matrimonial domicile in Vermont. In 1951 defendant deserted
plaintiff, but continued to provide for her support and for that of their child.
Defendant secured an ex parte divorce decree in Nevada in 1952 and thereafter
discontinued his support of plaintiff who then instituted a Vermont action
seeking support for herself and the child and challenging therein the validity
of the Nevada decree. In 1953, while the action in Vermont was pending,
plaintiff reestablished her New York domicile and one year later sequestered
defendant's New York property seeking, pursuant to section 1170-b of the
New York Civil Practice Act, relief identical to that sought in Vermont. The
appellate division affirmed, without opinion, the judgment of the supreme
court dismissing the complaint. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals
held, two judges dissenting, that section 1170-b is inapplicable to a wife who
becomes domiciled in New York subsequent to a valid ex parte divorce decree
of another state. Loeb v. Loeb, 4 N.Y.2d 542, 152 N.E.2d 36, 176 N.Y.S.2d
590 (1958).
It is now familiar law that a divorce decree may be completely effective to
dissolve a marriage yet ineffectual to alter the support and custody incidents2
of that marriage.' The Supreme Court of the United States in Estin. v. Estin,
found "divorce divisible." It held that alimony rights under a prior separation
decree could not be adjudicated in an ex parte divorce proceeding without personal jurisdiction over the wife. 3 In the Estin case, the wife's right to support
was embodied in a prior separation decree. To preserve the alimony rights of a
wife who had not obtained, prior to the husband's ex parte divorce, any support
order, the New York Legislature added section 1170-b to the Civil Practice
Act. The section reads:
In an action for divorce, separation or annulment, or for a declaration of nullity
of a void marriage, where the court refuses to grant such relief by reason of a finding
by the court that a divorce, annulment or judgment declaring the marriage a nullity
had previously been granted to the husband in an action in which jurisdiction over
the person of the wife was not obtained, the court may, nevertheless, render in the
4
same action such judgment as justice may require for the maintenance of the wife.
The court in the present case denied plaintiff relief, reasoning that section
1170-b was enacted to protect New York wives5 which plaintiff was not, since
at no time during the course of her marriage was she domiciled in New York.
1. Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 200, 97 N.E.2d 748, 751 (1951).

2. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
3. Ibid. In some states a support order does not survive divorce. In these cases, the
efficacy of an ex parte decree is decisive. Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U.S. 279, 280
(1945).
4. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1170-b.
5. The Law Revision Commission recommended the statute "to protect a New York
wife whose right to support from her husband may . . . be completely cut off by an
ex parte foreign decree, in the absence of a previous New York separation decree, with
provision for maintenance. . . ." Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. 463, 468 (1953).
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6
The majority noted that while plaintiff satisfied the residence requirement,
marital
her
to
enforce
she came to New York divorced, having sought
rights in the courts of another state.7 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt8 was distinguished, since in Vanderbilt the wife was not yet divorced when she established her New York domicile. 9 While the appellate division in Vanderbilt
noted that, "an entirely different question might be presented if the Nevada
10
divorce had been rendered before the wife took residence in New York," the
statute itself suggests no such limitation. The legislature, in fact, gave the
courts power to do "as justice may require" for the maintenance of the wife.
Only in the recommendation of the Law Revision Commission do the words
New York wife" appear and its meaning is left ambiguous. It is questioned
whether a "New York wife" cannot be one who is domiciled in New York at
the time she seeks relief pursuant to section 1170-b or must she further prove
a New York domicile at some time prior to the divorce? Even with the added
condition plaintiff would qualify for relief since she was a New York domiciliary
prior to her marriage. The majority imposed a further limitation that she
prove a New York domicile subsequent to her marriage and prior to the ex parte
divorce. But New York would have a sufficient interest in any event so long
as the wife was domiciled in New York when she instituted her action. New
York is rightly concerned lest the spouse be left impoverished and perhaps
become a public charge.' 2 Her present domicile gave New York reason to act
sufficient to repel any attack on jurisdictional
and at the same time an interest
3
or constitutional grounds.1

6. Where the parties were married without the state, New York requires that the
plaintiff or the defendant be a resident of the state when the action is commenced and that
such party have resided therein for at least one year continuously at any time prior to the
commencement of the action. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1165-a(3).
7. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the Nevada divorce and custody and support of the child, but reversed the lower court as to support for the wife.
118 Vt. 472, 114 A.2d 518 (1955). The Vermont court having no statute similar to section
1170-b held itself to be without jurisdiction to award the wife alimony.
8. 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553, 153 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956), aff'd, 354 U.S. 14 (1957). This
case held that a state, in the absence of personal jurisdiction cannot adjudicate the absentee
spouse's right to support, and a state having appropriate jurisdiction is thereafter free to
award alimony; cf. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 575-81 (1956) (concurring
opinion).
9. The wife in the Vanderbilt case came to New York in February, 1953. In March,
1953, her husband commenced an action for divorce which was granted in June, 1953, and
in April, 1954, the wife began her action in New York.
10. 1 App. Div. 2d 3, 11, 147 N.Y.S.2d 125, 132 (1st Dep't 1955), aff'd, I N.Y.2d 342,
135 N.E.2d 553, 153 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956), aff'd, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
11. Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. 463, 467-68 (1953).
12. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
13. The right to support of the New York domiciliary would in any situation be considered a personal right and granting alimony would not violate the full faith and credit
clause. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 549 (1948). An analogous situation arose in May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 where the husband, a domiciliary of Wisconsin, instituted a divorce
action against the wife, a domiciliary of Ohio, who did not appear. An ex parte decree
was granted the husband including custody of the children. The Supreme Court held
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On the other hand the husband here obtained his divorce over a year before
section 1170-b went into effect.14 The court did not allude to this fact. It is
nonetheless pertinent. For it might plausibly be argued that plaintiff would
have been denied relief even had she come to New York prior to the divorce.
Is section 1170-b retroactive? It might be that the section did not revive
rights in the wife which for all practical purposes were terminated by the
ex parte divorce. Two lower court cases so reasoned.' 5 There is also support
in the Law Revision Commission statement recommending the adoption of
section 1170-b that: "The Commission believes that legislation is necessary to
protect a New York wife whose right to support from her husband may now be
completely cut off by an ex parte foreign divorce decree, in the absence of a
previous New York separation decree with provision for maintenance."' 6 But
this misconstrues the effect of the ex parte decree or at least begs the question.
The ex parte decree does not "cut off" the wife's right to support 17 as the
Commission asserts. It does not affect the right to support at all. For only
a court with personal jurisdiction over the wife could adjudicate her right to
support even in the absence of a pre-existing alimony decree .1 New York in
enacting section 1170-b did not confer a right upon the wife. It simply recognized that her rights, whatever they might be, were not the proper subject
for adjudication by the court entering the ex parte decree and New York
chose to give the wife a means to have those rights adjudicated. Since the
statute is, therefore, remedial in nature there is no serious objection to according it retroactive effect.
The majority expressed the fear that a more liberal construction of section
1170-b might make New York an attraction for alimony seeking wives, that
New York might become a mecca for the alimony seeker just as states with lax
or liberal divorce laws have become attractive to the divorce seeking spouse.
But there is a very practical difference in that the spouse who seeks a divorce can
go to any state. Domicile alone satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for
divorce. 19 The wife who seeks alimony will come to New York only if she can
obtain personal jurisdiction over the husband in New York or if the husband
has property in New York upon which quasi in rem jurisdiction can be
based.2 0 Personal jurisdiction or an equivalent of personal jurisdiction over
that an Ohio court does not have to give full faith and" credit to a Wisconsin decree awarding custody of the children to their father when that decree is obtained by their father in
an ex parte divorce action in a Wisconsin court which had no personal jurisdiction over
the mother. Id. at 528, 529.
14. The divorce took place in July 1952, whereas the effective date of the statute was
April 1953.
15. Edell v. Edell, 6 Misc. 2d 631, 159 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Methfessel v.
Methfessel, 124 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1953). But see Meenan v. Meenan, 286 App. Div.
775, 147 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1st Dep't 1955), appeal dismissed per curiam, 1 N.Y.2d 269, 135
N.E.2d 30, 153 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1956).
16. Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. 463, 468 (1953).
17. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
18. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
19. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
20. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1171-a.
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the husband is necessary in order to obtain relief under section 1170-b. It
would seem, therefore, that there is considerable exaggeration in the fear that
New York might become a mecca for migrant wives.
Incompetency - Right of Unadjudicated Incompetent To Sue or To Hire
Attorneys in His Own Behalf.-Plaintiff wife instituted an action for separation in which she alleged that although she left her husband's abode in New
York, she did so while she was mentally incompetent and incapable of recognizing the nature or consequences of her action. The appellate division
affirmed an order of special term which denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint, awarded temporary alimony, appointed a special guardian
and directed payment of counsel fees. The court of appeals, one judge dissenting, affirmed, holding that a court may entertain the action of an unadjudicated incompetent even where the incompetency is alleged by the plaintiff
herself. Sengstack v. Sengstack, 4 N.Y.2d 502, 151 N.E.2d 887, 176 N.Y.S.2d
337 (1958).
Section 236 of the New York Civil Practice Act allows a party of full age
who has not been judicially declared incompetent to prosecute or defend a
civil action either in person or by an attorney.' The section, obviously enacted
for the benefit and protection of the incompetent, has been construed literally
so that only a judicially declared incompetent is barred from prosecuting and
defending in his own name. Thus, a plaintiff committed to a mental hospital and
certified as mentally ill pursuant to section 70 of the New York Mental
Hygiene Law has capacity to sue in his own name since such certification does
not amount to an adjudication of mental incompetency 2
In the instant case, the court was faced with the problem of deciding whether
an admission of incompetency by the plaintiff was tantamount to an adjudication of her incompetency.
The facts showed that the plaintiff went to Minnesota accompanied by her
son by a former marriage and upon her petition and allegation of incompetency,
a Minnesota probate court in an ex parte proceeding without a hearing appointed her son general guardian of her person and estate. The defendant in
a prior action relied on this Minnesota decree to vacate the appointment of a
guardian ad litem in New York, successfully contending that the plaintiff was
not a judicially declared incompetent. Thereafter the Minnesota court refused
upon the plaintiff's petition to decree a restoration to capacity. The defendant
in the present case attempted to rely on this refusal for the proposition that
his wife was judicially declared incompetent by the Minnesota court.
1. An inquisition is made before a jury to determine the party's incompetency and, if
found, a committee is appointed to manage the incompetent and his affairs. Such an adjudication of incompetency in legal parlance is commonly referred to as "office found."
Finch v. Goldstein, 245 N.Y. 300, 303, 157 N.E. 146, 147 (1927).
2. "A certification that a person is afflicted with a mental disease requiring care and
treatment is not the same thing as an adjudication that he is incompetent to manage himself or his affairs." Anonymous v. Anonymous, 3 App. Div. 2d 590, 592, 162 N.Y.S.2d 984,
987 (2d Dep't 1957).
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The jurisdiction of the New York Supreme Court to extend a foreign adjudication of incompetency depends upon whether it was sufficiently shown
that the alleged incompetent had been adjudged incompetent in the state of
her domicile. 3 If the foreign court "be found to have acquired jurisdiction
full faith and credit must be given to its decree." 4 The plaintiff, who was in
fact incompetent, could not be presumed to have the requisite intent which
would be necessary to acquire a valid Minnesota domicile. The defendant's
attempted reliance on the Minnesota decree was therefore disallowed because
a foreign adjudication of incompetency is not binding in New York upon a
party who has never relinquished her New York domicile. 5
It was argued by the dissent in the present case, 6 that the plaintiff conceded
her incompetency and, therefore, she lacked the capacity to sue, that because of
her admitted mental incapacity she was not qualified to make a determination
concerning her own interests, and that the proper procedure to protect the
plaintiff required an adjudication of incompetency and the appointment of a
committee pursuant to article 81 of the New York Civil Practice Act.
Heretofore, where the mental capacity of the plaintiff has been challenged,
it was the defendant who raised the issue. Thus, a plea by the defendant
alleging that the plaintiff was incompetent at the time of the suit and incapable
of suing but failing to allege that the plaintiff had been so found by judicial7
determination or that a committee had been appointed was considered bad.
Until judicial determination of incompetency "any person is presumed to be
of a contrary demonstration resting upon him who alleges
sane with the burden
8
incompetency."
In rejecting the dissent's contention the court of appeals concluded that
the problem of how best to protect the interests of the plaintiff was adequately
9
handled by special term when it duly appointed a special guardian. There
is further support for the court's action in view of the fact that the supreme
3. Matter of Curtiss, 134 App. Div. 547, 119 N.Y. Supp. 556 (1st Dep't 1909), aff'd
mem., 197 N.Y. 583, 91 N.E. 1111 (1910).

4. Id. at 551, 119 N.Y. Supp. at 559. In the Curtiss case a party who was a resident
of Connecticut was adjudged incompetent and a committee was duly appointed. New
York gave full faith and credit to the Connecticut decree.
5. Matter of McHie, 233 App. Div. 388, 253 N.Y. Supp. 166 (1st Dep't 1931), aff'd
mem., 258 N.Y. 589, 180 N.E. 345 (1932); Gasper v. Wales, 223 App. Div. 89, 227 N.Y.
Supp. 421 (1st Dep't 1928).
6. Judge Van Voorhis of the court of appeals dissented without further opinion on
the basis of the dissenting opinion of Judges Peck and Botein of the appellate division.
7. Dudgeon v. Watson, 23 Fed. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1885). In Williams v. Empire Woolen
Co., 7 App. Div. 345, 39 N.Y. Supp. 941 (4th Dep't 1896) an answer to a complaint submitted by a defendant which alleged that the plaintiff was incompetent when he brought
an action on a promissory note was held to be frivolous inasmuch as the plaintiff had never
been judicially declared insane.
8. Matter of Palestine, 151 Misc. 100, 103, 270 N.Y. Supp. 844, 847 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
9. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 207 provides: "The Supreme Court may appoint a guardian
ad litem or special guardian for an infant or an incompetent person, at any stage in any
action or proceeding, when it appears to the court necessary for the proper protection of
."
the rights and interests of such infant or incompetent person. ...
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court may appoint a special guardian even where there has been an appointment of a committee after an adjudication of insanity if there is some conflict
of interest between the incompetent and the committee. 10 Clearly where one
is in fact incompetent but not judicially declared so, the courts must take
cognizance of the situation and protect the litigant's interests."
The majority cited the highly controversial decision of the court of appeals
in Matter of Frank'2 in which there was some language to the effect that a
special guardian could be appointed for an adjudicated incompetent only.
However, the Frank case was concerned with the power of the court to pay a
special guardian's fee from the estate of an alleged incompetent who died
during a proceeding for the appointment of a committee. There was no objection made by the court to the initial appointment of the special guardian. The
holding in Frank was that the court never acquired jurisdiction over the property of the alleged incompetent's estate because the proceeding ended with that
party's death. The present court distinguished Matter of Frank by restricting
the language used therein to its precise facts.
There would seem to be no reason for section 207 of the New York Civil
Practice Act' 3 if it were confined to adjudicated incompetents by virtue of the
fact that an adjudicated incompetent would be represented by his committee
and there would be no reason to appoint a special guardian for his protection.
to persons who have
This section obtains usefulness only if it is read in regard
4
not been adjudged incompetent but are in fact so.'
If one is declared incompetent pursuant to article 81 of the New York Civil
Practice Act and a committee has been duly appointed to protect his interests,
a contract made by the incompetent with a lawyer is void since one may not
assume the relation of an attorney for an adjudged incompetent. 15 In Finch v.
Goldstein16 it was held that the acts of a person "of unsound mind before a
committee has been appointed are voidable, not void. If the party is in fact
incompetent when he acts, such acts may be set aside at his election either by
himself or a committee when appointed. The Finch case, however, has not
been applied in New York to the question of the authority of an unadjudged
incompetent to hire an attorney.
Where one is in fact incompetent but not judicially declared so, the decisions
conflict as to the authority of an attorney to act for the incompetent. In Merritt v. Merritt'7 the authority of an agent acting under a power of attorney
10. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 208.
11. "Incompetent persons become the wards of the court, upon which a duty devolves
of protection both as to their persons and property. This duty is not limited to cases only
in which a committee has been appointed, but extends to all cases where the fact of incompetence exists. . . ." Wurster v. Armfield, 175 N.Y. 256, 262, 67 N.E. 584, 585 (1903).
12. 283 N.Y. 106, 27 N.E.2d 801 (1940).
13. See note 9 supra.
14. See McCabe v. State, 208 Misc. 485, 144 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Ct. CI. 1947).
15. Matter of Deimer, 274 App. Div. 557, 85 N.Y.S.2d 506 (4th Dep't 1948).
16. 245 N.Y. 300, 157 N.E. 146 (1927). The court here stated that a deed executed by
an unadjudicated incompetent was not void, but voidable.
17. 27 App. Div. 208, 50 N.Y. Supp. 604 (1st Dep't 1898).
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was held to be suspended by the insanity of his principal. In the recent case
of Matter of Lanami' 8 the purported consent given on behalf of an incompetent to her attorneys in a compensation suit to act in her behalf was not
allowed to be exercised since, in that court's view, incompetence terminated
any prior authority. This case also held that the plaintiff could not bring an
action until a committee or next friend be appointed. In Runberg v. Johnson 9
a beneficial association got one of its members to sign a release from obtaining
sick benefits while the member was non compos mentis. In an action by the
member to recover the sick benefits the defendant association contended that
the plaintiff was incompetent to appoint an attorney who was therefore without authority to appear in the plaintiff's behalf. There was a judgment for
the plaintiff and that court concluded that, since a lunatic has the power to
appear in his own name until a committee has been appointed, he can be
represented by an attorney.
The present court accepted the Runberg reasoning and held that since an
unadjudged incompetent may sue, it follows that such incompetent should be
represented by attorneys who have authority to prosecute the action.
This case points out the latitude of the New York Supreme Court when
exercising jurisdiction as a court of equity in dealing with a person in need
of the protection of the court because of incompetency. It would certainly be
bad practice for a court to allow a defendant to challenge the plaintiff's mental
capacity, unless it appears to the court that the plaintiff is in need of the
court's protection due to his mental condition. The
abuses which might result
20
from such a practice would indeed be disastrous.
The court of appeals upheld the special term's order to the special guardian
to investigate and to report the plaintiff's position and what necessary steps
should be taken to protect her. The merits of the plaintiff's separation action
were never reached. After the instant case was decided, upon recommendation
by the special guardian, a proceeding under article 81 of the New York Civil
Practice Act 2' was subsequently instituted to declare the plaintiff judicially
incompetent.
It would, therefore, seem more practical where incompetency is alleged in
the complaint for the supreme court to stay the action until an inquisition is
instituted under article 81 of the New York Civil Practice Act. By such a
stay the court would decrease the amount of time spent in litigation while
awaiting the report of a special guardian if the party is in fact incompetent.
Furthermore, it would also lessen the possibility of sham regarding the merits
of the case by reason of the fact that where incompetency is alleged, as in the
instant case, it becomes essential in order22 to sustain the plaintiff's cause of
action that incompetency be clearly shown.
18.

1 Misc. 2d 264, 144 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1955).

19.
20.
21.
22.

11 N.Y. Civ. Proc. 283 (City Ct. 1886).
Dudgeon v. Watson, 23 Fed. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
See note 1 supra.
See Sobel v. Sobel, 180 Misc. 618, 42 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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Applicability of New York State Standard Fire Insurance

Statute to "Jewelers' Block Policy".-Plaintiff, a retail jeweler, sued the
defendant insurance company for fire loss under an all-risk "Jewelers' Block
Policy." Certain warranties, not included in the standard fire insurance policy,
were incorporated in the block policy, and concededly were breached. The
trial court entered judgment for the insurer. The appellate division reversed,
holding that the all-risk "Jewelers' Block Policy" is a severable grouping of
separate risks, which remains subject to the standard fire policy statute' as
to fire coverage, and is not voided by breach of warranties in the policy which
are not specified in the standard fire policy. Woods Patchogue Corp. v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., 5 App. Div. 2d 577, 173 N.Y.S.2d 859 (2d Dep't 1958).
A "Jewelers' Block Policy" provides all-risk coverage against loss of stock
on the jeweler's premises or in transit, with fire coverage optional. It is a type
of inland marine insurance2 authorized by section 46 of the New York Insurance Law, 3 but for which no standard policy form is prescribed. A standard
fire policy form, however, is set out in section 168 of the Insurance Law, with
the stipulation that, "no policy or contract of fire insurance shall be made...
on any property in this state, unless it shall conform as to all provisions, stip4
ulations, agreements and conditions, with such form of policy."
The insuring clause of the standard fire insurance policy limits its coverage
to property at a fixed or specified location. 5 Although termed "floater coverage," the "Jewelers' Block Policy" is also primarily intended to insure property
the standard fire rate
located on the jeweler's premises. 6 In a block policy,
7
is used and forms the basis of the insurance rate.
Whether the legislature intended to class the inland marine insurance contract as an independent species of insurance, or merely as a severable grouping
of separate risks has never been adjudicated heretofore in New York. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in an analogous situation, held that a fine arts
1. N.Y. Ins. Law § 168.
2. This term refers to a combination of marine, fire, and casualty insurance which was
originally designed to provide transportation insurance on land, similar to marine insurance.
Later, it was developed under the names of "floater" or "block" policy to provide coverage,
often all-risk, on property, floating or movable in nature, as well as at fixed locations where
there was need for adequate and broader protection than might be obtained under the
forms of fire and casualty insurance. Appleman, Inland Marine Insurance 1-12, 110-12
(1st ed. 1934).
3. N.Y. Ins. Law § 46(20) (c).
4. N.Y. Ins. Law § 168.
5. The policy does not cover property other than at the location described. Forms
attached to the policy may extend a portion of the coverage to other locations, or on a
blanket basis to any other location, but such extension must be given specifically for such
coverage to be effective. Rodda, Fire & Property Insurance 49 (1956).
6. The block policy does provide transportation coverage on goods in hands of salesmen
and in transit to and from customers and supply houses, but the limits of liability are so
specified that the principal coverage is at insured's premises described in the policy. Rodda,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 333.
7. Id. at 287.
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policy,8 which by its terms insured permanently located property against fire
and other risks, was not marine insurance for the purpose of rate regulation,
and was, therefore, governed by the statutory provisions regulating fire insurance contracts. 9 Similarly, in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Vermes Credit Jewelry,10 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, on facts virtually identical
to those of the principal case, held that the Minnesota legislature, in authorizing
the writing of inland marine policies," did not intend to permit the insurer to
condition his liability for fire loss other than by warranties authorized by the
standard fire statute. 12 The court stated:
Whether a policy of insurance is a fire insurance contract . . . depends not upon
what the policy is labeled or how the insurance is classified, but upon the risk or
risks which are insured against ....

[A] Minnesota policy insuring a stock of goods

at a fixed location against loss by fire is, to that extent at least, a fire insurance
contract, even though it covers other risks and provides broader coverage in some
respects against a fire loss than does the standard form.' 3
The court in the instant case adopted the same rationale. It recognized that
the label given a particular contract was merely an arbitrary designation with
no effect on the substantive rights of the parties; 1 4 thus the classification of
the policy as marine insurance does not destroy the protection afforded the
insured by the fire insurance statute. The policy was held to be severable as
to the risks because had the insured elected to forego the convenience of a
combined policy and to take his fire coverage in a separate policy, such policy
would have been written in the standard statutory form, and, therefore, the
standard fire insurance policy was applicable to the fire coverage involved.
Judicial authority for severing the coverages of the block policy was found
in cases dealing with automobile insurance. In American Sur. Co. v. Rosenthal,'5 the contract stated the risks separately and fixed the rates accordingly,
8. This policy form provides all-risk coverage on private or public collections of paintings, sculpture, and other articles of rarity, historical value, and artistic merit. Magee,
General Insurance 313 (5th ed. 1957).
9. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Mortensen, 230 Wis. 377, 284 N.W. 13 (1939).
10. 185 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1950). Here the insured sought recovery for a fire loss under
a "Jewelers' Block Policy" although he had breached a warranty which was not within the
standard fire insurance policy.
11. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 70.61(4) (Supp. 1957). Here inland marine insurance is defined
generically, while in New York it is defined by enumeration of specific coverages.
12. Minn. Stat. § 65.01 (1945), as amended, (now Minn. Stat. Ann. § 65.011 (Supp. 1957)).
13.

182 F.2d 142, 144-45 (8th Cir. 1950).

14. Stecker v. American Home Fire Assur. Co., 299 N.Y. 1, 84 N.E.2d 797 (1949). This
case cited with approval Blair v. National Sec. Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 955, 957 (3d Cir. 1942),
which found that § 46 of the N.Y. Ins. Law licensed certain types of corporate forms to do
certain classified kinds of business, and that such classification was negative to any substantive rule of law governing a particular risk. The terminology "inland marine" is partly
historical and partly statutory, and is often arbitrarily applied to risks which are not popularly thought to be such risks. Davis Yarn Co. v. Brooklyn Yarn Dye Co., 293 N.Y. 236,
247-48, 56 N.E.2d 564, 569 (1944).

15. 206 Misc. 485, 133 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mem., 1 App. Div. 2d 652,
147 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1st Dep't 1955).
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although the total premium could be paid in gross. The court held that the
property damage section of the contract was severable from the personal injury
section, and that the condition applied to the former only.16 A similar question
arose in International Indem. Co. v. Duncan 7 a suit brought upon a combination automobile insurance policy protecting against loss by fire or theft.
Contrary to a "no mortgage" clause in the said contract, the plaintiff placed
an encumbrance on the insured vehicle. The court held that the legal effect
of the combination policy was the same as if two separate policies had been
issued to the insured. Therefore, since the contract was divisible, and since a
"no mortgage" clause in a separate fire policy was prohibited by statute, the
court refused to apply it to the fire provisions of the combination policy.' 8
Acceptance of the principles of these decisions, the majority felt, was necessary to forestall widespread circumvention of the fire insurance statute and
preserve the rights of insurer and insured-the insurer with respect to the
imposition of warranties for protection against fraud on the part of the insured,
the insured with respect to adequate protection under the imposed conditions
of the insurer.' 9 The majority further found that the substantive rights of the
parties were unaffected by the approval of the form of the policy given by
the Superintendent of Insurance a
The dissent found in section 46 of the New York Insurance Law statutory
authority for subjecting the fire coverage of the contract to the general terms
contained therein. This section, it reasoned, authorizes a form of insurance
independent of the standard fire policy, which should not be limited by the
statutory provisions applicable to another form. The entire discussion of the
applicability of the fire policy statute was considered immaterial by the dissenting justices since both the standard fire insurance contract and the block
policy would be avoided by the misrepresentations of the insured. The opinion
noted that, "the standard fire policy provides that it shall be void if the insured
has 'wilfully concealed or misrepresented' any material fact." 2 '
16. In Fantozzi v. Security Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 247 App. Div. 686, 289 N.Y. Supp. 458
(3d Dep't 1936), the court had already noted the severability of the fire and supplemental
theft coverages in an automobile insurance policy.
17. 254 S.V. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
18. Accord, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Owens, 272 S.W. 611 (Teax. Civ. App. 1925); 44
CJ.S. Ins. § 336 (1945). Contra, Motors Ins. Corp. v. Stowers, 206 Okla. 692, 246 P.2d 341
(1952). Here the court stressed that the "no mortgage" clause in the automobile insurance
policy covering among other casualties, fire, was binding on the parties as the contract did
not purport to be in the standard form to which the fire insurance statute applied.
19. The policy underlying the fire statute is set out in Nelson v. Traders' Ins. Co., 181
N.Y. 472, 474-75, 74 N.E. 421, 422 (1905) ; Hicks v. British Am. Assur. Co., 162 N.Y. 284,
291-92, 56 N.E. 743, 745 (1900).
20. Kocak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 237 App. Div. 780, 263 N.Y. Supp. 283 (3d
Dep't), aff'd mem., 263 N.Y. 518, 189 N.E. 677 (1933); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 451, 169 N.E. 642 (1930).
21. 5 App. Div. 2d 577, 586, 173 N.Y.S.2d 859, 867 (2d Dep't 1958). Although the block
policy in its provision for avoidance of the contract omits the word "wilfully," the dissent

found it difficult to conceive a misrepresentation not wilful.
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The majority in the instant case found the Vermes decision persuasive. In
that case, however, there was the additional fact that the legislature had expressly excepted from the standard fire policy statute, motor vehicle insurance
covering loss or damage by fire when combined in a single policy with other
risks 3 The court there felt that, in the absence of express legislative exemption,
the multiple risk policy at issue was within the fire policy statute, in so far as the
policy covered loss by fire. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Mortenson 24 provided a close analogy for the present court. If a combination policy, including
coverage of risk of loss by fire at a fixed location, is found to be a fire policy
for rating purposes, it would appear to be a fire policy for standard form
purposes 2 5
The coverage of goods in a fixed location, and only incidentally in transit,
under the "Jewelers' Block Policy" does not constitute, with respect to the
fixed location, a risk different from that involved in the standard fire contract.
If a contrary decision had been reached in the instant case, a premium would
have been placed on form rather than substance. Combination policies, regardless of extent of coverage, could then be interpreted as distinct forms of insurance. They would, therefore, as entireties be exempt from the provisions
enunciated by the legislature for the severable risks therein. For such policies,
the statutory fire form would be impliedly repealed. Thus, insurance companies
would become the sole judges of what combination policies against fire and
other risks should contain, and the legislative mandate embodied in section
168 of the Insurance Law would be nugatory.
Insurance - The Meaning of the Word "Accident" in a Liability Insurance
Policy.-Plaintiffs, undertaking a construction contract with the City of New
York, agreed to assume all liability for physical injury and property damage
caused by acts of construction regardless of negligence. To insure themselves
against this liability, plaintiffs obtained from the defendant insurance company a general liability policy with an endorsement limiting liability to
$50,000 for each accident and $100,000 for the aggregate operation.
In the course of construction the plaintiffs dug a continuous trench parallel
and adjacent to two buildings and built two temporary cinder block walls to
protect the sub-basement level of each building. An unusual rainfall flooded
the trench causing the restraining walls to collapse and the sub-basements of
the two buildings to be flooded, thereby damaging the property of the tenants
located therein.
The defendant refused to indemnify the plaintiffs in excess of $50,000, claiming there had been only one accident. The appellate division held that because
the operative hazards insured against within the meaning of the policy were
22. See note 10 supra.
23. Minn. Stat. § 65.02 (1945), as amended.
24. 230 Wis. 377, 284 N.W. 13 (1939).
25. Both Wisconsin and Minnesota have since changed the effect of these decisions by
statutory amendments. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 203.06(5), (6) (1957); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 65.02
(Supp. 1957).
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acts of the insured, there were two accidents, damage having been caused by
the collapse of the two restraining walls. Johnson Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co.,
6 App. Div. 2d 97, 175 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1st Dep't 1958).
How are we to construe the word "accident" used in the limitation clause
of the standard third party liability policy? Two theories have been suggested.
The so-called "cause theory" equates "each accident" with the proximate
cause of the injury so that one cause equals one accident no matter how many
parties are injured or properties damaged." The "effect theory" considers each
injury or damage suffered by a property owner a separate accident. 2 The
weight of authority in this country has adopted the "cause theory ' 3 and it
*has been said that the "effect theory" rests upon an antiquated English decision
and a distinguishable American case.4 The problem has been dealt with extensively in texts, law review articles and annotations.5
The policy here in question was a standard third party liability policy, 6 ex1. The cases which follow this theory, in proceeding on the ground that the policy is
to be construed according to the intention of the parties, have determined that the intention of the ordinary man taking out an insurance policy is to interpret the word "accident"
in the limitation clause to mean the act or event which has caused the injury. The leading
cases are St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Rutland, 225 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1955); Hyer v.
Inter-Ins. Exch., 77 Cal. App. 343, 246 Pac. 1055 (2d Dist. 1926); Truck Ins. Exch. v.
Rohde, 49 Wash. 2d 465, 303 P.2d 659 (1956). See also Denham v. La Salle-Madison Hotel
Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948); Tri-State Roofing Co. v.
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 139 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
2. The rationale behind this position is that the insured party wishes to protect-himself
against claims of parties injured through the insured's instrumentality., See Anchor Cas.
Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1949); South Staffordshire Tramways Co. v. Sickness & Acc. Assur. Ass'n, [18911 1 Q.B. 402.
3. Anchor Cas. Co. v. McCaleb, supra note 2, which is the leading American authority
for the "effect theory," was expressly rejected by the court in St. Paul-Mercury Indem.
Co. v. Rutland, 225 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1955). It is significant that both cases were heard
in the same circuit and that Judge Holmes wrote both opinions.
4. The English decision referred to is South Staffordshire Tramways Co. v. Sickness &
Acc. Assur. Ass'n, [1891] 1 Q.B. 402. Anchor Cas. Co. v. McCaeb, 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.
1949) has been distinguished on its facts. See St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Rutland,
supra note 3. In the Anchor case an oil well "blew in" and damage was caused to several
surrounding properties by oil which was blown about together with sand and mud for a
period of fifty hours.
5. 8 Appleman, Insurance § 4891 (1942). See also Comment, 26 Fordham L. Rev. 506
(1957). For a note on St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Rutland see 2-U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 423
(1955). The problem is also the subject of an annotation in 55 A.L.R.2d 1300 (1957).
6. The policy issued to the plaintiff was a Comprehensive General Liability policy which
provided as follows:
"Coverage B-Property Damage Liability.
"To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated to
pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law, or assumed by him under contract as defined herein, for damages because of injury to or destruction of property,
including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident." Brief for Plaintiff, p. 3, Johnson
Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co.
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tended by endorsement to insure all of the plaintiffs' contractual liability with
the City of New York, regardless of negligence. 7 The effect of this endorse-8
ment was not to convert the policy into one of indemnification against loss,
but merely to remove the question of negligence in determining the plaintiffs'
legal liability. In other words, the hazard insured against was not property
loss, but acts of construction resulting in loss.
The New York court here rejected both the cause and effect theories and
fashioned a test based on the operative hazard insured against.9 Since the
operative hazard insured against was acts of construction regardless of negligence, the court concluded that there were two separate acts of construction,
two separate walls erected which collapsed at separate times, and that though.
there was but one flood, there were two accidents.
In the two leading and most recent decisions dealing with this problem,
St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Rutland'° and Truck Ins. Exch. v. Rohde,"
where more than one person was injured by one act of negligence, the question
was whether there was one or multiple accidents.' 2 The lower courts in both
instances found that there were multiple accidents even though there was but
one act of negligence on the part of the insured. Thus the effect theory was
followed. 13 The appellate courts in reversing held that the word "accident"
should be equated with the cause of liability, the negligent act of the insured,
viz., one negligent act causing injuries, no matter how many, should equal one
accident. The higher courts espoused the cause theory.
In the instant case, however, there were clearly two acts, 14 namely the build7. "Contractual Liability and Property Damage Endorsement No. 1.
"It is agreed that . . .such insurance . . . shall also apply to the liability assumed by
the insured under Contract . . . between the named Insured and the City of New
York . ..."
Article XLVII of the contract referred to further states, "whether such damage or injuries be attributable to negligence of the Contractor or his employees or otherwise." Brief
for Plaintiff, pp. 3, 4, Johnson Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co.
8. A liability policy by its nature insures a party against any acts for which he may
become legally liable; the insurance company's obligation arises when such act, resulting
in liability, occurs. Indemnity insurance, on the other hand, directly insures against loss;
legal liability is not a condition precedent to the company's obligation. See 1 Richards,
Insurance § 166 (5th ed. 1952).
9. 6 App. Div. 2d 97, 103, 175 N.Y.S.2d 414, 420 (1st Dep't 1958).
10. 225 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1955).
11. 49 Wash. 2d 465, 303 P.2d 659 (1956).
12. In the St. Paul-Mercury case a truck, operated by an employee of the insured,
collided with a freight train causing damage to sixteen cars belonging to fourteen owners.
In the Rohde case, an automobile, driven by the plaintiff, struck three motorcycles.
13. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Rutland, 225 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1955). The case
was reported in the Federal Reporter Advance Sheets, 217 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1955), but
did not appear in the bound volume of the Federal Reporter system because the opinion
was set aside on March 22, 1955. Prior to the decision in Truck Ins. Exch. v. Rohde, 49
Wash. 2d 465, 303 P.2d 659 (1956), the Superior Court, Yakima County, Washington, had
entered judgment against the insurer. The case is unreported.
14. The court in the instant case is very explicit on the point that the retaining walls
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ing of two restraining walls at different times which collapsed separately. To
bring this case within the problem area, so to speak, dealt with in the prior
decisions, the question would have to be whether there were two (cause theory)
or several (effect theory) accidents since several property owners suffered
loss. This, however, is not the question stated by the court. 15
The question presented by the court was whether there was one or two
accidents. The only possible theory under which it could be held that there
was one accident under the set of facts in this case, is that the proximate cause
of the damage to the two buildings was the single cause of rain or flood. The
court, however, pointed out that neither rain nor flood was the proximate cause
of the damage' 6 and that the insurance which the plaintiffs had did not cover
these hazards. 17 This is indisputable. It is elementary insurance law that a
liability policy covers acts by the insured for which he may become legally
liable, as distinguished from a policy to indemnify against loss,1 s and it is
an accepted principle of tort law that where an act of God such as rain or
flood concurs with a negligent act to produce injury, and the consequences of
the act of God can reasonably be foreseen, as here, then the proximate cause
of the injury is the negligent act and not the act of God. 19
The only other conclusion, then, is that there were two accidents, which is
what the court held, on the ground that the hazard insured against was acts
of construction, and two of these acts, the construction and collapse of the
two walls, caused the injury to the two properties. Is this not an adoption of
of
the "cause theory" when the court states the test: "What is the event
20
liability here, the operative hazard which brings the policy into play?"1
It is submitted that the court in this case has not really dealt with the
problem which faced the courts in the St. Paul-Mercury and Rohde cases
simply because it was not necessary to decide the issue. Under either the
effect theory or cause theory the court would have found that there were two
accidents because two causes (ruling out the flood as the cause) caused two
injuries. What then is the theory on which this decision rests? The court
poses the question whether there was one or two accidents. By making this
the issue, it is merely asking what was the cause of the injury; the single
cause of rain or flood or the double cause of two acts? As a question of fact,
it finds that the collapse of the two walls caused the injury. Therefore the
word "accident" is equated with the number of causes-a clear espousal of
the "cause theory." This is made quite clear when the court states that if a
were separately built by the plaintiff, and collapsed separately. 6 App. Div. 2d at 104, 175
N.Y.S.2d at 421.
15. "There is no doubt that there was an accident in this case; the question is whether
there was mori than one." 6 App. Div. 2d at 100, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
16. 6 App. Div. 2d at 104, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
17. Id. at 103, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
18. "It is the purpose of Liability Insurance to indemnify the insured against the consequences of negligent maintenance, operation, or use of property or the business operations
of manufacturers and contractors . . . ." 1 Richards, Insurance § 17, at 60 (5th ed. 1952).
19. Prosser, Torts § 49, at 275 (2d ed. 1955).
20. 6 App. Div. 2d at 103, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
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employees caused the
single blow of a pickaxe wielded by one of the plaintiffs'
21
two injuries, there would have been but one accident.
Is the test then to be the cause of the injury? This case would seem to say
so-with the additional requirement that the cause be also the hazard insured
against, or, more properly, that the hazard insured against be a substantial
factor in causing the injury. The New York Court of Appeals has held that
when the hazard insured against is the factor causing the injury or loss then
policy coverage ensues,22 and when the hazard insured against is not the cause
of the damage, then the policy does not operate.2 3 Thus, if the policy will not
operate unless the hazard insured against caused the injury or loss, it is not
illogical to conclude that this "covered cause" should be the factor to determine the limitation of a liability policy. This is a proper test when it is considered that the nature of a liability policy is to insure against legal liability
and this liability does not arise until the insured's act causes injury.
It is a valid conclusion that the court in this case has clearly adopted the
"cause theory" but with a slightly different approach. The hazard insured
against, as a substantial causal factor is the test. In the light of the reasoning
of Tonkin v. California Ins. Co.2 4 and Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co.,2 5 it is felt that if a situation such as in the instant case comes before the
court of appeals, the reasoning of this decision would be followed.
Labor Relations - Effect of Grievance Procedure and Arbitration Provisions of Collective Agreement on Individual Employee.-Plaintiff brought
an action against her employer for wrongful discharge in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. She alleged that her union arbitrarily refused
to take up her claim with the employer pursuant to the grievance procedure
of the collective bargaining agreement. The defendant employer demurred.
The trial court sustained the demurrer on the ground that the collective agreement barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland unanimously reversed, and held that an employee will not be barred from maintaining an action for wrongful discharge against the employer where the union,
as the collective bargaining representative, acted arbitrarily or in a discriminatory manner in refusing to arbitrate the employee's grievance with the employer.
Jenkins v. Win. Schluderberg-T. J. Kurdle Co., 217 Md. 556, 144 A.2d 88
(1958).
21.

Id. at 104, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 422.

22. Tonkin v. California Ins. Co., 294 N.Y. 326, 62 N.E.2d 215 (1945).
23. Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918).
24. 294 N.Y. 326, 62 N.E.2d 215 (1945). Under a policy insuring "Loss of or Damage
to the Automobile, Except by Collision but including Fire, Theft and Windstorm," a
collision caused by smoke from a fire in the car, getting into the eyes of the driver, was
held to be covered by the policy because, as the hazard insured against, it caused the
collision.
25. 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918). Under a policy insuring against fire, the court
found that damages caused to the plaintiff's building by a concussion from an explosion
caused by fire, was not covered because the cause of loss was not the hazard insured
against.
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For the purposes of enforcement, authorities have made a distinction- between various classes of rights created or guaranteed by the collective agreement. Certain rights, such as receipt of wages, vacation pay, overtime, and,
possibly,' protection from discharge (except for cause), are considered as
inhering peculiarly in the individual and not enforceable except by him or
with his consent. Other provisions, such as closed shop clauses and dues checkoff, are for the exclusive benefit of the union so that individual members cannot
sue to enforce them.2 Such distinctions must be approached with care. The
interests of employee and union are far too interdependent to permit such a
neat separation. 3 Moreover, the fairly recent Lincoln Mills4 case makes this
distinction even more tenuous. It is now apparently possible for an arbitration
clause to be made wide enough to bring hitherto individual rights within the
scope of union enforcement. 5
Today nearly all collective agreements contain a procedure for resolving
disputes and problems arising under the agreement.6 These procedures usually
1. Not all authorities are agreed that such provisions are to be construed as creating
a right to job security in the individual. E.g., "However, a different answer might be
given where the term restricts--conditionally-the common law right of an employer to
discharge his employees, and the condition consists of giving only the union the right to
challenge the propriety of such a discharge upon the grounds of the absence of a 'just
and proper cause.'" Lenhoff, The Effect of Labor Arbitration Clauses Upon the Individual,
9 Arb. J. (ns.) 3, 12 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Lenhoff]. But see Parker v. Borock,
6 CCH Lab. L. Rep. ff 65159 at 65591 (36 CCH Lab. Cas.) (N.Y. 1959) where the court
held the right belonged to the individual.
2. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S.
661 (1946) (union settling members' claims without authorization); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954), aff'd,
348 U.S. 437 (1955) (attempt by union to enforce vacation pay clause); MacKay v.
Loew's Inc., 182 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1950) (employees attempting to enforce closed shop
clause); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 605-16 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Cox]; Lenhoff 5-6.
3. If, for instance, wages and hours were the exclusive concern of the employee then
by simply refusing to enforce his collective rights he could, in effect, make an independent
contract with his employer. But all individual contracts of hire must conform to the
collective agreement. See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
4. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1956).
5. "A claim' is made by the union that the men are receiving improper wages. This
is made a grievance; the grievance procedure then becomes operative. If an arbitration
clause covers this particular claim, arbitration should be requested; if the company refuses
arbitration, an action to enforce the arbitration clause will then be decided on the merits.
But if the arbitration clause does not cover the gravamen of the grievance so that the suit
must be based on other clauses of the contract not related to the arbitration clause, the
action will be dismissed without consideration of the merits, and the underlying argument
is not settled; the employees, to the extent that such an action is available, must sue on
the contract in the respective state courts. The obvious approach, therefore, for those so
interested, is to achieve a broader arbitration clause, if it is intended to try to process all
germane contractual claims via the arbitration 'route." Kramer, Arbitration Under the
Taft-Hartley Act 6 (1958) (presented to the N.Y.U. 11th Annual Conference on Labor).
6. It has been pointed out that this phenomenon has been' caused partly by the early
distaste and later confusion with which the collective agreements were received by the
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provide for a discussion between the aggrieved employee, a shop steward or
other union official, and some representative of management ending, if unresolved earlier, in arbitration. 7 The arbitration is usually between the union
and the employer, the employee not being considered a party.8
The arbitration clause, like the collective agreement itself, is generally
enforceable, at least to the extent that an employee will be barred from bringing an action against his employer, unless it can be shown that all remedies
available under that agreement have been exhausted. 9
If the union is willing to take the employee's case through the various
stages of the grievance procedure, refusal of management to cooperate is usually
no obstacle since refusal to bargain is an unfair labor practice under the TaftHartley Act. 10 Also, in some jurisdictions there are statutory methods to force
a party to such an agreement to arbitrate." In a fairly recent case the Supreme
Court specifically enforced an agreement to arbitrate. 1 2 In one federal case a
suit was permitted against a reluctant employer despite the arbitration clause. 13
When, however, it is the union which refuses to arbitrate, the situation becomes
more complicated.
Congress has not under the NLRA completely subjected the rights of the
individual to arrangement between union and management. 14 If the employee
can establish a violation of the NLRA or the Railway Labor Act 15 he can
proceed on his own before the appropriate administrative board.' 6 To allow,
therefore, the parties to a collective agreement to deprive the employee of his
individual rights merely by inserting an arbitration clause does seem to "border
courts so that the parties, like the merchants of the Middle Ages, set up what amounted
to their own judicial system. See Cox 604-05; Gregory, Labor and the Law 467 (2d ed.
rev. 1958) [hereinafter cited as Gregory].
7. See Cox 627-30; Gregory 481-82.
8. See Cox 629.
9. It is understandable that such arbitration clauses should find favor with courts since
they relieve the courts of what would be a heavy burden of litigation, insure a hearing
before parties familiar with the problems of a particular field, and promote a spirit of
law and order in what too often has been an economic jungle. See, e.g., Transcontinental
& Western Air, Inc. v. Koppel, 345 U.S. 653 (1953); Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal.
App. 2d 558, 277 P.2d 464 (1954); Jorgensen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 25 N.J. 541, 138 A.2d
24 (1958); Parker v. Borock, 6 CCH Lab. L. Rep. f[65159 (36 CCH Lab. Cas.) (N.Y.
1959). Contra, Alabama Power Co. v. Haygood, 266 Ala. 194, 95 So. 2d 98 (1957);
Dufour v. Continental So. Lines, 219 Miss. 296, 68 So. 2d 489 (1953).
10. 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952). See, e.g., Allied Mills, Inc., 23 L.R.R.M.
1632 (1949); Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 24 L.R.R.M. 1518 (1949); Vanette Hosiery
Mills, 23 L.R.R.M. 1198 (1948).
11. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1448-51.
12. See note 4 supra.
13. United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 223 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1955).
14. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); NLRB v. Augusta Chem. Co.,
187 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1951); Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945);
see also Lenhoff 15-17.
15. 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952).
16. See note 14 supra.
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on the incredible."' 17 However, while recognition must be accorded individual
rights, the bargaining position of the union must also be preserved.
The undesirability of allowing the employee to be completely dominated
by agreement between union and management is obvious.18 Yet, the position
of the union in the collective bargaining arena will be weakened if it cannot
exercise some discretion over what grievances shall be presented to management and how far they shall be pressed. 19 Acting in complete good faith, the
union may believe the grievance unjustified or of such small importance as
not to justify the expense and effort of an arbitration fight. Or, though the
matter be both just and weighty, yet, in the interests of the group as a whole,
the union may not want to see it pressed.2 °
A New York case 2 1 has laid down three possible roads for an aggrieved
employee to follow if he is not willing to leave his claim to the discretion of
his union. Assuming jurisdiction, he might take his case before the appropriate
federal board. He might sue his union for damages, should it fail to handle
his case properly. Or, should the union agree to arbitrate, he might move to
intervene. Another lower New York court case simply gave the employer a
choice between arbitrating with the employee in place of the union or facing
a court action.2 2 The latter solution 23 was mentioned but neither commented
on nor relied upon by the instant court.
A related problem, though not considered in the instant case, is whether the
employee has a remedy should the union actually take his case to arbitration
and then negligently or maliciously fail to press it effectively. Unless he can
24
have the arbitrators' award set aside on rather narrow statutory grounds,
to
him
his case has been effectively destroyed if the courts will not permit
intervene. There is authority pointing both ways.2 5 The general trend today
17. See Lenhoff 15.
18. See, e.g., Time, Sept. 15, 1958, p. 16; Aug. 18, 1958, p. 14-15; id., July 21, 1958,
p. 15; July 14, 1958, p. 18. Recent press scandals have pointed out that not all union
officials are fit guardians of the employee's interests. See note 14 supra.
19. See Parker v. Borock, 6 CCH Lab. L. Rep. ff 65159 at 65592 (36 CCH Lab. Cas.)
(N.Y. 1959) (concurring opinion); Gregory 494.
20. See Cox 625-27; Gregory 482.
21. Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709 (3d
Dep't), aff'd mem., 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E.2d 227 (1954).
22. Matter of Julius Wile Sons & Co., 199 Misc. 654, 102 N.Y.S.2d 862 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
23. Accord, Cox 652. Contra, Lenhoff 15.
24. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1462-62(a). But cf. Soto v. Lenscraft Optical Corp.,
7 App. Div. 2d 1, 180 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1958).
25. In Matter of Iroquois Beverage Corp., 159 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1955), intervention
was permitted. But in I. Miller & Sons v. United Office Workers, 195 Misc. 20, 88 N.Y.S.2d
573 (Sup. Ct. 1949), an opposite result was reached. In Cox v. R. H. Macy & Co., 152
N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1956), and in Sholgen v. Lipsett, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup.
Ct. 1952), the court refused to direct arbitration between employer and union at the
prayer of the individual employee. Despite its statutory provisions the law is in a "state
of flux" on this entire question, but there seems to be a trend toward granting more protection to the employee. Manson, Labor Relations Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1365, 1374-75
(1957). Most of the law on this subject is New York law. Lenhoff 5.
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is toward recognizing that, whether it becomes the employee's or the union's
26
prerogative to press the issue, the other is entitled to some voice in the matter.
The solution in the instant case, based on a fiction of trust, seems to be
commendable. The court showed itself solicitous for the bargaining position
of the union and the value of private arbitration by affirming as a general rule
that an employee cannot proceed against his employer unless all the remedies
available under the collective agreement have been exhausted. It is only where
the union has acted wrongfully in refusing to champion his cause that the
employee himself will be permitted to enforce the agreement. The case is
open to attack on the pragmatic ground that an employee, by merely pleading
wrongful conduct by his union, can take his employer to court to decide at
least the question of the union's good faith. At least to this extent the union's
bargaining position is weakened.
Whether or not the instant case is viewed as sound,27 one principle clearly
emerges. An employee has a substantive right, which can be the basis of at
least an action for damages, to honest, nondiscriminatory representation from
his collective bargaining representative.2 8 There is, however, a procedural
29
difficulty. Unions are invariably unincorporated associations. At common law
such associations could neither sue nor be sued without joining each and every
member. In the case of something like the UAW this would obviously be
impossible. In some jurisdictions, an employee still faces this problem. 30
Section 301 of the NLRA 31 removes this problem for employers and unions
by letting them sue each other in federal courts without regard to diversity or
amount of compensation. This privilege, however, does not extend to the em26. To illustrate the right of the employee to be represented see note 21 supra and
accompanying text. For the right of the union see 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
which specifically gives it the right to be consulted in any settlement between employer and
employee.
27. From a view of strict stare decisis we cannot say whether the case is sound or
unsound. As authority in support of the decision see Marranzano v. Riggs Nat. Bank,
184 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1950) where the court held that the right of an employee to sue
did not depend upon any grant by the agreement itself; NLRB v. Bull Insular Lines, 233
F.2d 318 (1st Cir. 1956) where a union and employer were held jointly and severally
liable for discriminatory practices; Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, 275 Wis. 495, 82
N.W.2d 172 (1957) where under facts similar to the instant case employees were permitted
to sue; Cox 645; Lenhoff 17. But for authority contra see Guszkowski v. United States
Trucking Corp., 162 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1958), and Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456,
88 A.2d 851 (1952), where under somewhat similar circumstances the court refused to permit
an action; see also Parker v. Borock, 6 CCH Lab. L. Rep. II 65169 (36 CCH Lab. Cas.)
(N.Y. 1959), where the facts were almost identical with the instant case and the court
refused to allow the employee to sue; see also Gregory 493.
28. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323
U.S. 192 (1944) (discrimination by white union against negro employee).
29. See, e.g., Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers, 165 Ind. 421, 75
N.E. 877 (1905); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Wood, 162 Va. 517, 175 S.E. 45
(1934).
30. See Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J. 456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952).
31. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952).
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ployee.3 2 He is left to the state courts or to federal courts in one of the instances
where one of them can sit as another state court s3 because of diversity and
amount claimed. Were this section amended to apply to individuals or were
similar statutes enacted by the states, this, along with his right to appear before
federal boards, might afford the employee ample protection in his rights without
undue interference with the workings of union and management. Until then,
the rule laid down by the highest court of Maryland is doubtless the best
safeguard the employee can have.
Trusts - Allocation of Dividends Payable in Stock or Cash at Option of
Trustee.-The codicil to testator's will provided "that any and all cash dividends ... upon shares of stock... shall be deemed income and that any and
all dividends payable in stock of the corporation declaring same shall be
deemed principal."' These shares, held by trustees, were in investment companies2 which gave their shareholders the option of taking current capital gains
distribution in either cash or stock. The trustees periodically exercised their
option by taking stock instead of cash, and distributed said stock to income
beneficiaries under the will. In an accounting proceeding the remainderman filed
objections based on the claim that the stock distributions by the investment
companies constituted principal rather than income. The court held that dividends payable out of the annual earnings of an investment company in stock or
cash at the option of the trustee are cash dividends, regardless of the manner in
which trustee shareholder elects to receive them, and that such dividends are
payable to the income beneficiary unless the will contains different directions.
In re Appleby's Estate, 175 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Surr. Ct. 1958).
In general, the principal of a trust estate includes not only the property which
32. 1 Werne, Law and Practice of the Labor Contract § 10.22 (1957).
33. 1 Werne, op. cit. supra note 32, §§ 9.13, 10.24.
1. In re Appleby's Estate, 175 N.Y.S.2d 176, 177-78 (Surr. Ct. 1958). Testator, a citizen
of the United States, was a domiciliary of Nassau in the Bahama Islands. The will was
probated both in the domicile, and in New York where most of the assets were located, in
accordance with N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 138. While the will contained no explicit direction
that the law of New York should govern its construction as foreseen in N.Y. Deced. Est.
Law § 47, and while every reference to New York law was in derogation of its obligations,
it was, nevertheless, held to apply. This ruling was proper since the parties themselves
argued in terms of New York law. The general plan of the will and the location of
testator's assets indicated that it was testator's understanding and intent that New York
law would govern except where otherwise explicitly provided. The court was of the
opinion that the decision of the issue would not have been different had the law of the
domicile been applied. See 12 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 5405 (perm. ed. rev. repl.
1957).
2. Companies electing to qualify as regulhted investment companies under Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 851, for special tax purposes are required to distribute to their shareholders as dividends 90% or more of their gross income, derived from interest, dividends
and gains from the sale of stock or securities, 'during each taxable year. 26 U.S.C. § 851
(Supp. V, 1958).
3. Such a distribution is a "gain or profit from the sale or exchange of capital assets."
N.Y. Tax Law § 350(13).
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comes into the trustee's hands, but also its enhancement in value and whatever
subsequently takes its place and represents it; 4 income, on the other hand,
represents the earnings of the trust property and embraces only net profits after
deducting all current expenses and charges. 5 What is included within the terms
principal and income is, however, primarily a question of intention on the part
of the creator of the trust. The creator's intention finds manifestation in the
terms of the trust instrument, construed in the light of the condition of his
affairs and the circumstances attendant upon the creation of the trust.
A stock dividend does not distribute the property of the corporation, but
simply dilutes the shares as they existed before the dividend so that each share
now represents a smaller fractional interest in the total amount of the corporate
property. 7 A cash dividend, on the other hand, diminishes the property of the
corporation by the amount paid out and leaves the fractional interest in the
corporate property represented by each share of stock precisely what it was
before. 8 At common law, in the absence of settlor's exhaustive determination
as to the distribution of cash and stock dividends on corporate shares held in
the trust, three rules of "presumable intention" 9 were formulated by the courts
to aid in the allocation of such dividends between principal and income beneficiaries. Under the Kentucky rule, which was not followed elsewhere and is no
longer in, vogue, all dividends declared during the life estate and payable out of
earnings were allocated to income. 10 The Pennsylvania rule" required dividends
to be allocated to income if declared out of earnings accruing to the corporation
during the period of the trust, but to principal if declared out of earnings prior
to the creation of the trust. Under the Massachusetts rule,'12 all cash dividends
4. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 355 (1955).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid. The intention of the settlor is the "controlling consideration in all cases, except
where for one reason or another it would be against public policy to carry out his intentions." 3 Scott, Trusts § 236.3 (2d ed. 1956). See 18 C.J.S. Corp. § 471, at 1123 (1938).
7. Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N.Y. 1, 12, 164 N.E. 723, 725 (1928). See Ballantine, Corporations § 208 (rev. ed. 1946).
8. 11 Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 1, § 5355. If a cash dividend is declared out of the
corporation's surplus, the ownership of the asset has passed from the control of the
corporation to the control of the shareholder. Warren, Taxability of Stock Dividends as
Income, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 891 (1920).
9. Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N.Y. 1, 9, 164 N.E. 723, 724 (1928); See 42
Cornell L.Q. 595, 600 (1957).
10. This was so regardless of the time of accumulation of the fund out of which the
dividends were paid. Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S.W. 778 (1892). See 3 Scott, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 1816. In 1956 Kentucky adopted a Uniform Principal and Income Act.
Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 386.190-386.340 (1956).
11. Dividends are designated income in so far as they do not impair the "intact value"
of the shares at the time of the creation of the trust. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857).
See 18 C.J.S., Corp. § 471, at 1129. This rule has been abandoned by Pennsylvania.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 3470.5 (Supp. 1957).
12. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868). See 3 Scott, op. cit. supra note 6. This rule
has been adopted by Restatement, Trusts § 236 (Supp. 1948) and the Uniform Principal
and Income Act § 5 (1931).

1958-591

CASE NOTES

are treated as income belonging to the life beneficiary and stock dividends of
the declaring corporation as principal going to the remainderman. Therefore,
when a corporation issues a dividend which the trustee is entitled to receive at
his option in cash or stock, a different result is reached by the courts according
to the rule followed at common law.1 3 Under the Pennsylvania rule, if the
action of the corporation were associated with an ordinary cash dividend, such
dividend would not be apportionable; while if it were associated with an extraordinary cash dividend or stock dividend, such dividend would be allocated
according to its source and effect on trust capital.' 4 Under the Massachusetts
rule, it has been held that such action on the part of the corporation is the declaration of a cash dividend, with the granting of a separate option to buy corporate stock at a given figure.' 5
New York, in the absence of any direction given by the settlor, has at one
time or another embraced all three rules of construction. Originally, the New
York courts allocated all dividends based on earnings or profits to income. 16
In 1913 the court of appeals modified this rule so as to apportion stock dividends between principal and income.t 7 Finally, in 1926, New York, in section
17-a of the Personal Property Law, provided that in the absence of a contrary
directive from the creator of the trust, "any dividend which shall be payable
in the stock of the corporation or association declaring or authorizing such
dividend . . .in respect of any stock of such corporation composing, in whole
or in part, the principal of such trust, shall be principal and not income of such
trust.'1 8 As the legislature did not elaborate on the meaning of a stock dividend,
it left the area open for judicial interpretation as to what was encompassed
13. Under all three rules, ordinary dividends are allocable to income; with respect to
other dividends, the Kentucky rule looked to the time of the dividend, the Pennsylvania
rule the source, and the Massachusetts rule the form. 12 Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 1,

§ 5403.
14. 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 846 (1948). See, e.g., Ballantine v. Young, 79 N.J.
Eq. 70, 81 AUt. 119 (1911); In re Thompson's Estate, 262 Pa. 278, 105 Adt. 273 (1918).
These two cases held that the rule of source and apportionment applied to extraordinary
cash dividends, when coupled with an option to buy the stock of the issuing corporation
at less than market price.
15. 4 Bogert, op. cit. supra note 14, at 340. If the trustee took the stock, he would be
treated as having bought it with the cash dividend, and not as having received the stock
direct from the corporation as a distribution of corporate property in the form of stock.
Davis v. Jackson, 152 Mass. 58, 61, 25 N.E. 21, 22 (1890). See 2 Perry, Trust and Trustees
§ 545b (7th ed. 1929).
16. See Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N.Y. 1, 9, 164 N.E. 723, 724 (1928);
McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N.Y. 179, 48 N.E. 548 (1897) ; 18 C.J.S., Corp. §.471, at 1129.
17. 250 N.Y. at 8, 164 N.E. at 723; Matter of Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723
(1913). This rule is still applicable to trusts created prior to 1926 which saw the adoption
of § 17-a of the Personal Property Law. See, e.g., Matter of Hagen, 262 N.Y. 301,
186 N.E. 792 (1933); In re Fahnestock's Estate, 156 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Surr. Ct. 1956), aff'd
mem., 5 App. Div. 2d 860, 172 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1958).
18. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 17-a. The legislature by its enactment endeavored to put
an end to the accounting complexities that had arisen in the administration of the law of
trusts. People ex rel. Clark v. Gilchrist, 243 N.Y. 173, 182, 153 N.E. 39, 41 (1926).
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within its scope. One lead as to the legislative mind at the time of adoption of
the section was found in section 350(8) of the Tax Law adopted the same
year. 9 In view of the confusion thereafter engendered by the attempts of the
courts to distinguish between regular and extraordinary dividends, 20 the court
of appeals in Matter of Ryan 2' finally held that the legislature did not intend
section 17-a of the Personal Property Law to be limited by the definition of
stock dividends in section 350 of the Tax Law, and that all stock dividends,
regular and extraordinary, were allocable to principal. The testator, however,
22
can still defeat the operation of the statute by contrary provisions in the will.
There are two decisions in New York pertaining to the question raised in the
instant case. In Kellogg v. Kellogg,23 the trust agreement, executed prior to the
adoption of the statute, directed that any stock dividend or dividends other
than cash received by the trustees upon the stock of a certain corporation should
be considered principal. There, the corporation on one particular occasion declared its dividend payable in cash or stock at the election of the trustee. The
trustee made no election and received stock, which he distributed to the income
beneficiary. The court in that case held: "This dividend was not a 'stock dividend' as that term is used in law .... A stock dividend is declared only by the
directors, and, therefore, it cannot be that the character of a dividend is to be
determined by the actions of the stockholders .... Moreover, this dividend was
paid not out of surplus but out of profits made during the current year, and it
has none of the other usual attributes of a stock dividend. It was not simply a
dilution of the existing shares, but it was an actual distribution of the property
of the corporation to those who elected to take cash. After its payment the
stockholders did not continue to own the same proportionate share of the assets
19. This statute defined stock dividends as "new stock issued, for surplus or profits
capitalized, to shareholders in proportion to their previous holdings" and excluded therefrom "any distribution made by a corporation out of its earnings or profits." N.Y. Tax
Law § 350(8).
20. In Matter of Villard, 147 Misc. 472, 264 N.Y. Supp. 236 (Surr. Ct. 1933), the court
held that the statute was limited only to extraordinary stock dividends and not to stock
dividends which were paid regularly from current annual earnings and were sold. In that
case, the court was influenced by the fact that for years, testatrix herself, with one exception,
had sold the stock dividends which she received, and that her primary object was income
for the life beneficiary. See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Ernst, 263 N.Y. 342, 347, 189
N.E. 241, 243 (1934). See also 3 Scott, op. cit. supra note 6, § 236.7.
21. 294 N.Y. 85, 60 N.E.2d 817 (1945).
22. See, e.g., Matter of Lloyd, 292 N.Y. 280, 54 N.E.2d 825 (1944) (testator directed
executors to treat all dividends as income) ; Matter of Matthews, 280 App. Div. 23, 111
N.Y.S.2d 405 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd mem., 305 N.Y. 605, 111 N.E.2d 731 (1953) (trust instrument provided that all stock dividends he deemed principal except that regular stock dividends paid in lieu of or in conjunction with regular cash dividends be deemed income);
Matter of Thorns, 4 Misc. 2d 987, 163 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (trust agreement provided that no dividend, ordinary or extraordinary, whether in cash, stock or other property,
should be considered principal). Discretionary power of trustee under the will is also
within the exception to the statute. In re Liebmann's Trust, 131 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct.
1954).
23. 166 Misc. 791, 4 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd mem. sub nom, Kellogg v. Neale,
254 App. Div. 812, 5 N.Y.S.2d 506 (4th Dep't 1938).
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of the corporation."2 4 In Matter of Hurd25 the court was faced with a situation
virtually identical to that of the instant case. The will, made after 1926, directed
that stock dividends in shares of the declaring corporation were to be regarded
as principal and cash dividends as income. The testamentary trustee received
dividends from investment companies, some of which were capital gains distributions, payable in cash or stock at the option of the owner. The trustee
failed to make election and received the dividends in the form of stock, some
of which he later sold and the proceeds of which he allotted to the income beneficiary. The court held that the dividends received from the investment trusts
were income and properly allocated to the life beneficiary. The corporation's
designation of the distribution as a stock dividend was not considered to have
made it a true stock dividend as contemplated by section 17-a of the Personal
Property Law. It distinguished this situation from that before the court in the
Ryan case2 0 and found that the distribution at issue was "an ordinary dividend
27
declared by the company in the regular course of its business."
The court in the present case reasoned that the option which entitled the
trustee to receive the dividends of the investment companies in stock or cash
could not reasonably be construed so as to give him discretion to distribute the
dividend among the beneficiaries in whatever way he chose 28 in the absence of
such explicit authorization by will 29 It concluded that the dividend was payable
to one beneficiary or another under a fixed and definitive rule, or was apportionable between them on an equitable basis. Influenced by the fact that the
legislature had discarded the application of the rule of apportionment to stock
dividends for trusts created after 1926,30 the court rejected the latter alternative
for the case at bar. Relying on the decisions reached in the Kellogg and Matter
of Hurd cases, the court stated that only a holding that the distribution was a
cash dividend and as such allocable to income would be consonant with the
policy of the state as formulated by the legislature, and would be in the best
interests of the estate beneficiaries. In arriving at its decision that the allocation
of this dividend should not be affected by the composition of the annual earnings,
the court was influenced by two lower court cases31 in which cash dividends
24. 166 Misc. at 792, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
25. 203 Misc. 966, 120 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
26. The court felt that the decision in that case was based on the extra stock dividend
declared. It did not find an option on the part of the stockholder to receive payment in
cash or in stock, or upon failure of election payment in stock, but rather a declaration of
both a cash and stock dividend.
27. Matter of Hurd, 203 Misc. at 972, 120 N.Y.S.2d at 109. The court felt that "the
option given to the stockholder in nowise changed the nature of the dividend. It only
provided a method for those stockholders who so desired, and who had confidence in the
future of the company to reinvest the dividend in the stock of the company by taking these
dividends in stock instead of cash, thereby obtaining a greater . . . share of the profits and
earnings of the company in the future." Id. at 973, 120 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
28. Davis v. Jackson, 152 Mass. 58, 25 N.E. 21 (1890).
29. See, e.g., In re Liebmann's Trust, 131 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
30: N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 17-a.31. Matter of Byrne, 192 Misc. 451, 81 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Surr. Ct. 1948); Matter of Bruce,
192 Misc. 523, 81 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1948). In both these cases, however, there were
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paid by investment companies were held to constitute income, whether or not
the earnings distributed were derived from interest and dividends or from
capital gains. The court was not unaware that its holding in the instant case
32
was in accord with the rule generally prevailing elsewhere on the question.
In failing to revive the Pennsylvania rule of apportionment in the instant
situation, the court gave its approval to the "rule of convenience and simplicity." While this rule might not accomplish in all cases precisely what the
testator had in mind when he created the trust,33 it was said, however, that "a

trustee needs one plain principle to guide him." The court found justification
for its holding in the fact that the distribution of the income would be expedited, extensive litigation avoided, and the trust in general benefited.3 4 This
approach might aptly be called an economic one or a practical economic
justification.
By extending the rule established in situations where the trustee, having an
option to elect his dividends in cash or stock upon failure of election received
stock which he sold for the benefit of income beneficiary, to the case where the
trustee exercises his option and takes stock for the income beneficiary, the
court has moved with the trend away from the Pennsylvania rule. 35 It is clear
that New York, in the absence of testator's express intention to the contrary,
will treat capital gains distributions of investment trusts payable in cash or
stock as income payable to life beneficiaries. The New York courts are not
prepared, in the absence of further legislation, to give assent to the argument
that dividends representing the annual earnings of a corporation, where the
buying and selling
of securities is the operating procedure, should be allocated
36
to principal.
Waiver - Right of Accused To Waive Jury Trial.-Infant petitioner, having been refused a severance of the trial of the indictment against him from
that of his co-defendants, sought to waive trial by jury. When his request was
denied by the county court judge, petitioner sought a joint writ in the nature
no stock dividends at issue. These decisions have evoked the criticism of those who look
upon the purchase of investment company shares, as akin to the retention of an agent or

investment counsellor, and regard capital gains distributions as a return of capital, no
matter how frequently made. See Ewart, Mutual Fund Dividends, 95 Trusts and Estates
1025 (1956).
32.

See Restatement, Trusts § 236 (Supp. 1948) ; Uniform Principal and Income Act § 5;

3 Scott, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1821-22.
33. The rule may work great hardship and injustice in many cases. 2 Cook, Corporations § 555 (8th ed. 1923). Indeed, it was the attempt to attain a "fair and just" ideal
that was the strongest reason in favor of the Pennsylvania rule, and explains its deep-rooted
popularity for so many years. See 3 Scott, op. cit. supra note 6, § 236.3.
34. In this particular case, it appears testator intended to provide the maximum benefits
of the trust for the immediate family during their respective lives.
35. With the exception of the application of the rule of apportionment to extraordinary
cash dividends, New York has abandoned the Pennsylvania rule. Matter of Osborne, 209

N.Y. 450, 477, 103 N.E. 723, 731 (1913).
36.

See note 32 supra.
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of prohibition and mandamus to forestall being tried before a jury. The court
held that under the New York State Constitution, a defendant in a non capital
criminal case who is sufficiently aware of the implications of his request, is
entitled to waive trial by jury as a matter of right. Scott v. McCaffrey, 12
Misc. 2d 671, 172 N.Y.S.2d 954 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
Many early state constitutional provisions1 prohibited an accused from waiving trial by jury because they considered it a prerequisite to the court's
acquiring jurisdiction over a criminal defendant. Most states have since repudiated this view, and have express provisions permitting waiver. However, the
majority of jurisdictions with such provisions do not allow a criminal defendant
to waive by his own unilateral act, but they require consent of the prosecution, 2
concurrence of the trial judge,3 or both.4
In New York, at common law, a criminal defendant could not waive his
"privilege" because of the public interest in the outcome of a criminal prosecution.5 In order to nullify the effect of this doctrine, the New York State Constitution was amended in 1938 to permit waiver in all cases except those involving capital punishment, "by a written instrument signed by the defendant
in person in open court before and With the approval of a judge . . . having
jurisdiction to try the offense." 8
The court in the case at bar interpreted the provision to mean that the request
of a criminal defendant to waive his right to a jury trial must be approved once
the judge has ascertained that the defendant was fully aware of the consequences
of his act. The court reasoned that the wording of the amendment clearly indicates that it is the instrument and the act of execution of that instrument
which required the trial court's approval, and not the resulting waiver. Such a
conclusion makes the term "approval" look to the exercise of merely an administrative or ministerial act.7 Although the term is susceptible of different mean1. See, e.g., Ga. Const. art. I, § 1; N.H. Const., part 1st, art. 15.
2. "A trial by jury may be waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of both parties,

expressed in open court by the defendant and his counsel.... ." Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.
3. The Oregon constitution permits waiver in cases other than capital cases if the trial
judge consents. Ore. Const. art. I, § 11.
4. Virginia allows waiver in any criminal case on the consent of both parties and the
concurrence of the court. Va. Const. art. I, § 8. The federal rule also requires trial by
jury "unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court
and the consent of the government." Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a). Patton v. United States, 281
U.S., 276, 312 (1930), commenting on this rule stated, "the consent of government
counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent
consent of the defendant."
5. Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858). In that case one of the jurors was withdrawn with the conseiit of defendant, his counsel, and the prosecutor. The court held that
defendant did not have the right to determine the manner in which he was to be tried by
waiving a jury of twelve persons and that the remaining jurors could not render a valid
verdict.
6. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2. The amendment goes on to stipulate that "the legislature
may enact laws, not inconsistent herewith, governing the form, content, manner and time
of presentation of the instrument effectuating such waiver."
7. See In re State Bank, 84 Utah 147, 30 P.2d 211 (1934). Here, the court, in inter-
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ings, it generally implies the final affirmative sanction of the acts of one person
by and in the discretion of another person.8 However, the instant court apparently felt that the language of the amendment, when viewed in the light of the
revised record of the 1938 Constitutional Convention, justified a departure from
the ordinary meaning of the word.
Emphasis was placed on the report of the proposing committee to the effect
that, "the proposal . . . is intended . . . to assure him (the defendant) by the
necessity for an approval by the judge of full opportunity to understand what
he is doing." 9 The court therefore concluded that stipulation for judicial approval was made solely as a guarantee that a defendant would be fully apprised
of his rights before permitted to waive trial by jury. 10
The constitutional provisions in respect of trial by jury have been uniformly
regarded as a valuable privilege bestowed upon an accused to safeguard him
from the arbitrary judgment of the court." Since this privilege was intended
primarily for the protection of the defendant, 12 it should be construed as a
personal right and the defendant alone should have the right to determine
whether or not to demand it, subject, of course, to reasonable judicial regulation
to insure an intelligent exercise thereof. It is hardly consistent to require the
consent of the court before the "privilege" can be waived. 13 A defendant can
part with his other constitutional safeguards 14 without the consent of the court,
and it would seem reasonable to put trial by jury on the same ground as his
other privileges.
Since the right to trial by jury is a personal guarantee accorded a defendant
for his protection, the defendant's exercise of it should not be conditioned upon
the consent of another unless such consent is unequivocally provided for in the
amendment in question. In view of the somewhat ambiguous wording of the
amendment at bar, the court was correct in construing it for the benefit of the
individual defendant.
preting a statutory provision which read in part "subject to the approval of the district
court of the county in which the office of such bank was located," accorded the word
"Capproval" merely a ministerial meaning.
8. See In re Rooney, 298 Mass. 430, 11 N.E.2d 591 (1937) where the court stated that
the term "approval," when it appears in statutes, generally implies the exercise of judicial
discretion. See 22 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 138 (1943) where the New York Constitutional
amendment was interpreted to require concurrence of the trial judge.
9. 2 N.Y. State Const. Convention, Rev. Record 1274 (1938).
10. Having once determined that the defendant can waive trial by jury as a matter of
right, the court concluded that whether or not the waiver attempt may have been a subterfuge to obtain a severance which had already been denied the defendant is immaterial.
12 Misc. 2d at 676, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
11. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 296 (1930). "In all criminal prosecutions,
"
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. ...
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
12. See Patton v. United States, supra note 11, at 298.
13. See Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695,
712 (1927).
14. For example, a defendant is free to waive his right to confront witnesses, the right
to cross examine witnesses, etc. See Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 13, at 703.
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Termination of Prior Nonconforming Use.-In 1924, petitioners

established a cooperage business in an unzoned area of the City of Buffalo.
In 1926, the area was zoned for residential use. In 1953, the city's ordinances'
were amended whereby existing nonconforming uses were allowed to continue
with certain exceptions. The petitioners' business fell within one of the excepted
categories and, by the provisions of the amendment, they were allowed three
years to liquidate the use. In 1956, the petitioners were notified that their
business operation must terminate at once. The petitioners initiated a proceeding in the nature of mandamus 2 to compel the city to issue a wholesale
junk license to them. The appellate division unanimously affirmed the order
of special term directing the issuance of a license on the ground that the
ordinance requiring a cessation of the nonconforming use was not a valid
exercise of the police power.3 The court of appeals, three judges dissenting,
reversed and remanded the case to special term for a final determination of
the issues. A zoning ordinance which provides for a reasonable period for the
amortization 4 of the owner's investment in a prior nonconforming use is a valid
and constitutional exercise of the police power. Harbison v. City of Buffalo,
4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).

In recent years, 5 municipal corporations, exercising the police powers delegated to them by their respective states, 6 have enacted comprehensive zoning
ordinances 7 to promote the general health, safety, welfare and morals through
the careful planning of the community. 8 Because of population shifts and the
commingling of business and residential areas, zoning commissions, in forming
and administering the various districts, have made allowances for existing
nonconforming uses, for, if such uses were retroactively legislated out of existence, this might involve a violation of the due process clauses of the federal
and state constitutions The state or municipality has the alternative of doing
nothing and hoping such uses will gradually disappear of their own accord or,
on the positive side, of legislating a solution. Since taking by eminent domain
1. Buffalo, N.Y., Ordinances, ch. LXX, § 18 (July 30, 1953).
2. This action is provided for in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1283-1306, more commonly
known as an Article 78 proceeding. For similar cases, pursuing the same remedy, see Larson
v. Howland, 124 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Pelham View Apartments, Inc. v. Switzer,
130 Misc. 545, 224 N.Y. Supp. 56 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
3. People v. Harbison, 4 App. Div. 2d 999, 169 N.Y.S.2d 598 (4th Dep't 1957).
4. Amortization is a term which has only lately been adapted to the law of zoning. It is
used to describe a process which involves a determination of the normal useful remaining
life of a building and a prohibition of the. owner thereof from using it in the proscribed
manner beyond the time so ascertained.
5. The first comprehensive zoning ordinance was passed in New York City in 1916. See
35 Va. L. Rev. 348 n.1 (1949).
6. See, e.g., N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 12.

7. The constitutionality of zoning itself as a valid exercise of police powers of a municipal
corporation was first upheld in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
8.

City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953).

9. "The overwhelming weight of present authority holds unconstitutional municipal
attempts to zone out prior uses." 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 7.03(3), at
423 (1955). See also 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 685.
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involves large expenditures of money on the part of the municipality, 10 the
solution denominated as "amortization" has of late been widely employed."
Here the owner of the nonconforming use is allowed a "reasonable" period of
time either to conform his use or to liquidate his interest. New York had not
followed the other jurisdictions which espoused this latter alternative.' 2 Its
position was reaffirmed as recently as 1952 in People v. Miller, where the court
stated: "It is the law of this state that nonconforming uses or structures, in
existence when a zoning ordinance is enacted, are, as a general rule, constitutionally protected and will be permitted to continue, notwithstanding the
contrary provisions of the ordinance."" s
The majority in effect 14 sanctioned the solution of amortization. 15

To

avoid overruling People v. Miller, it stressed that the rule contained therein
must be considered in light of the fact that zoning contemplates the gradual
elimination of all nonconforming uses. 16 However, ordinances passed to accom10. Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
Rev. Stat. c. 24, § 73-1 (1957) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19-2919 (1949);
11. See, e.g., ill.
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 462.12 (1947); Va. Code Ann. §15-843 (1950). This solution of the
amortization of nonconforming uses has been included in the zoning ordinances of several
large American cities. See Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 43 Cal.
2d 121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954).
12. "It was stated by the zoning Commission that the purpose of [zoning] was to stabilize and protect lawful investments and not to injure assessed valuations or existing uses.
This has always been the view in New York. No steps have been taken to oust existing
nonconforming uses." Bassett, Zoning 113 (1940). The same author, however, looking
at the situation from a negative point of view states: "The charter of the City of New
York and the three enabling acts (i.e. those acts which permit nonconforming uses to
continue in existence) of the state of New York omit any provision prohibiting retroactive
regulations." Id. at 116.
13. 304 N.Y. 105, 107, 106 N.E.2d 34, 35 (1952), noted in 19 Brooklyn L. Rev. 149
(1953). In this case the defendant was required to terminate his nonconforming use of
keeping pigeons as a hobby. This use was held to be an insubstantial investment. As the
court stated: "This [protective] rule, with its emphasis upon pecuniary and economic loss,
is dearly inapplicable to a purely incidental use of property for recreational or amusement
purposes only." 304 N.Y. at 109, 106 N.E.2d at 36.
14. Judges Desmond and Fuld concurred with the majority, but relied on the principles
stated in People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).
15. The leading out-of-state cases are Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d
410 (5th Cir. 1950); Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d
121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954); City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34
(1954) ; Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798 (1957) ; State ex rel.
Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co.
v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929) ; Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301,
129 A.2d 363 (1957). The California cases cited seem to hold that any exception for nonconforming uses which does not provide for its automatic termination would be reasonable.
See also 35 Va. L. Rev. 348, 357 (1949).
16. "But ... the policy of the law is the gradual elimination of a nonconforming uses
[sic], and, accordingly, ordinances should not be given an interpretation which would
permit an indefinite continuation of the nonconforming use." 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.189, at 488 (3d ed. rev. 1957). Accord, O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69
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plish this ultimate goal must always be reasonable otherwise, they will be
violative of due process. 17 The majority pointed out that reasonableness must
be interpreted in the light of the specific facts of each case and in terms of
the balance between the private injury to the owner of the use and the social
harm which the continuance of the use would have on the community. If the
loss to the private owner, therefore, is relatively insubstantial 8 compared to
the communal benefit' 9 and, if the period of amortization is justly proportionate
to the extent of the private investment involved,2 0 the zoning ordinances will
be construed as a valid exercise of the police power. The absence of any one
of these prerequisites which safeguard the owner will render an ordinance
subject to attack by the courts as an unconstitutional deprivation of a vested
property right.2 '
Without writing a separate opinion, Judges Desmond and Fuld concurred
in the result reached by the majority upon the principles stated in People v.
Miller.2 Their determination apparently was not upon the ground that the
Idaho 37, 202 P.2d 401 (1949). As to the effect of an amendment in this regard see City of
Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
17. See notes 8 and 12 supra. Cf. Town of Somers v. Camarco, 308 N.Y. 537, 127 N.E.2d
327 (1955). For a detailed discussion of this concept see Noel, Retroactive Zoning and
Nuisances, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1941).
18. See, e.g., New York Trap Rock Co. v. Town of Clarkstown, 3 N.Y.2d 844,'144
N.E.2d 725, 166 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1957); People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952);
Rice v. Van Vranken, 225 App. Div. 179, 232 N.Y. Supp. 506 (3d Dep't), aff'd mem., 255
N.Y. 541, 175 N.E. 304 (1930); Fox Lane Corp. v. Mann, 216 App. Div. 813, 215 N.Y.
Supp. 334 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 243 N.Y. 550, 154 N.E. 600 (1926).
19. See Bassett, Zoning 115-16 (1940). Compare People v. Kesbec, Inc., 281 N.Y.
785, 24 N.E.2d 476 (1939) and People v. Wolfe, 272 N.Y. 608, 5 N.E.2d 355 (1936), with
Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930).
20. However, some of the cases cited by the majority in support of the theory of
amortization do not appear to consider this aspect of the problem. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co.
v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929). In both those cases, the owners of business
establishments (a grocery and a drugstore) which were deemed nonconforming uses, were
given just one year to amortize their uses.
21. The leading New York case is Town of Somers v. Camarco, 308 N.Y. 537, 127
NE.2d 327 (1955). However, it is interesting to note that Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore,
212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957), also cited by the majority, specifically declares itself
to be contra to Town of Somers v. Camarco, supra. For other cases where the investments
made or the liabilities incurred by the owner were too substantial to defeat his use or, in
other words, his rights were vested, see Crossroads Recreation v. Broz, 4 N.Y.2d 39, 149
N.E.2d 65, 172 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1958); 440 E. 102d St. Corp. v. Murdock, 285 N.Y. 298, 34
N.E.2d 329 (1941); City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 134 N.Y. 163, 31 N.E. 443 (1892); People
ex rel. Ortenberg v. Bales, 224 App. Div. 87, 229 N.Y. Supp. 550 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 250
N.Y. 598, 166 N.E. 339 (1929). In City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, supra, which involved a
fire ordinance* of the city of Buffalo, the court, in its holding, stressed that the state may
delegate its police powers to the city to enable it to pass such an ordinance. However,
it further pointed out such ordinance referred to future buildings and not to those existing
at the time of its enactment. See also 10 Fordham L. Rev. 116 (1941).
22. 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).
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petitioners were allowed a reasonable time to amortize their use, but rather
that the use did not represent a substantial monetary investment. This reasoning is questionable for the exceptions to the general rule of the Miller case
involve only incidental uses of land. 23 This reasoning, nonetheless, may limit

the precedent value of the instant case, since it may plausibly be argued that
the concurring opinion did not indorse the broad theory of amortization, but
instead, expressed a willingness to extend the strict rule2 4 of People v. Miller
to an appropriate case.
The dissent drew attention to the fact that, the petitioners' use was a lawful
one25 and represented a substantial business investment lately made. It argued
that these factors were completely ignored and the refusal to permit the petitioners to continue their use was justified solely on the ground that the business
was, by the terms of the ordinance, a junk yard.26 However, the greatest concern expressed was over the adverse effects of retroactive zoning 27 and the
anticipated uncertainty and confusion which would result. As regards the
former, the dissenting opinion stated that, "Retroactive zoning, as this clearly
is, resembles slum clearance more than zoning, which is for the future."28 It
was further pointed out that, by circumventing the proper procedure of acquiring such property by an eminent domain proceeding, this was, at best, a deprivation of a vested property interest without just compensation.2 9 But, the
latter consideration is, by far, the more critical. Muncipal councils, by the
letter of this new trend in the law, will have a wide latitude in determining
the durations of the particular nonconforming uses within their jurisdictional
limits "without any workable [objective] standards" except the very dubious
one of reasonableness. A likely result would be a situation where the same
type of nonconforming use, not far removed geographically, would have a
different tolerance period. 30
In determining whether the police powers were exercised within the constitutional limits, each case must be decided individually on the basis of the
23.
24.

Ibid.
See Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).

25. "Generally speaking, a nonconforming use existing at the time a zoning ordinance
goes into effect cannot be prohibited or restricted by statute or ordinance, where it is a
lawful business or use of property and is not a public nuisance . . . ." 8 McQuillin, op. cit.
supra note 16, § 25.181, at 467 (3d ed. rev. 1957). For an interesting discussion of the
concept of nuisance in relation to the present problem, see Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394 (1915), which is reviewed in Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 Colum.
L. Rev. 457 (1941).
26. For an analogous case involving a junk yard see City of Akron v. Chapman, 160
Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953).
27. See 8 McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 16, § 25.184 (3d ed. rev. 1957).
28.

4 N.Y.2d 553, 567, 152 N.E.2d 42, 49, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 609 (1958).

29. "There are also statutes in some states permitting municipal corporations to eliminate nonconforming uses in residential zones by eminent domain proceedings, and this
seems both an effective way to deal with the scourge of nonconforming uses and just to
the owner of the property." 1 Antieau, op. cit. supra note 9, § 7.03(3), at 425 (1955).
30. A similar situation existed in Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon,
307 N.Y.493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954), noted in 68 Harv.L. Rev. 1089 (1955).
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effect of the ordinance on the particular property involved. 31 In addition, the
burden of showing that the ordinance is an abuse of said powers is upon the
attacking party,32 as a presumption of validity attends the enactment of zoning

ordinances.3 3 Certainly, then, the amortization of nonconforming uses should
not be chosen by default as the solution to the administrative problems of
zoning unless definite controls are instituted. One such control would be the
enactment of legislation creating uniform conformity schedules, graduated on
the basis of the assessed value of the property. 34 A compromise system known
as "performance standards" regulation has been advocated. 3 5 This entails the
setting up of workable standards by which the damaging effects of nonconforming uses on adjoining property can be eradicated. But, "when the use first
fails to meet the standard requirements, 3the
owner will be ordered either to
6
abate such conditions or amortize his use."1

Real property and the possessory interests of the landowner have always
enjoyed a protected position in the law, and rightly so. Therefore, in the
absence of controls, unless the rule of the instant case is strictly limited to
instances where the investment has been nominal, many small businessmen
will suffer. It might well be that, by reason of the split among the majority
judges, the case may hereafter be treated simply as a reaffirmation of People
v. Miller. Judge Froessel's opinion is nevertheless, in its indorsement of the
amortization theory, a studied departure from the reasoning of the earlier
New York case.
31. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also City of Los
Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954); Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 121, 272 P.2d 4 (1954). The preceding is given greater significance in the light of this declaration of a unanimous United States Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice McKenna: "We do not notice the contention that the ordinance is
not within the city's charter powers nor that it is in violation of the state constitution,
such contentions raising only local questions which must be deemed to have been decided
adversely to petitioner by the Supreme Court of the State." Hadaheck v. Sebastian, 239
U.S. 394, 414 (1915). Accord, Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th
Cir. 1950).

32. "Upon parties who attack an ordinance such as the present rests the burden of showing that the regulation assailed is not justified under the police power of the state by any
reasonable interpretation of the facts. 'If the validity of the legislative classification for
zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.'
Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 118, 89 N.E.2d 619, 620 (1949).
33. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1950); Spurgeon v.
Board of Comm'rs, 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798 (1957); Grant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 212
Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
34. In this way similar types of nonconforming uses will receive equal treatment no
matter where they are located. Also, as regards the time period for amortization, the larger
the investment made or represented, the greater the amount of time allowed for the owner
to conform his use.
35. 30 Ind. LJ. 521, 528 (1955).
36. Id. at 529.

